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Preface 
“Someday a computer will give a wrong answer to spare someone's feelings, 
and man will have invented artificial intelligence”. 
― Robert Breault 
The AI Robotics Ethics Society (AIRES) is a non-profit organization 
founded in 2018 by Aaron Hui to promote awareness and the importance 
of ethical implementation and regulation of AI.  
AIRES is now an organization with chapters at universities such as UCLA 
(Los Angeles), USC (University of Southern California), Caltech (California 
Institute of Technology), Stanford University, Cornell University, Brown 
University, and the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul 
(Brazil).  
AIRES at PUCRS is the first international chapter of AIRES, and as such, 
we are committed to promoting and enhancing the AIRES Mission. Our 
mission is to focus on educating the AI leaders of tomorrow in ethical 
principles to ensure that AI is created ethically and responsibly.  
As there are still few proposals for how we should implement ethical 
principles and normative guidelines in the practice of AI system 
development, the goal of this work is to try to bridge this gap between 
discourse and praxis. Between abstract principles and technical 
implementation. In this work, we seek to introduce the reader to the topic 
of AI Ethics and Safety. At the same time, we present several tools to help 
developers of intelligent systems develop "good" models. This work is a 
developing guide published in English and Portuguese. Contributions 





“By far the greatest danger of Artificial Intelligence is that people conclude too 
early that they understand it”. 
― Eliezer Yudkowsky 
It is not an uncommon situation when an individual, or a group of 
individuals, finds themselves in front of a decision-maker responsible for 
making some form of judgment based on a set of observable facts and 
characteristics (e.g., a judge in a civil court, an appraiser in a job 
interview, or a bank manager responsible for authorizing, or not, a loan). 
However, what is new is the use of statistical inference models to 
automate such processes (e.g., models created by machine learning). 
As autonomous systems affect more and more people and society, 
understanding the potential risks related to such systems (and how to 
mitigate them) must be deepened. To anticipate, prevent, and mitigate 
the undesirable consequences of such systems, it is critical that we 
understand when and how problems can be introduced throughout the 
life cycle (i.e., data collection, training, validation, testing, deployment, 
etc.) of such systems. 
We certainly cannot reduce all types of intelligent systems, or “Artificial 
Intelligence” (AI), to just Machine Learning. We also have the symbolic 
approach (Newell, 1990), the connectionist approach (Churchland & 
Sejnowski, 1992), hybrid methodologies (symbolic/connectionist), the 
mathematical-universal approach (Hutter, 2005), among several other 
methodologies that seek to develop systems capable of simulating certain 
cognitive capabilities to solve various types of problems (e.g., genetic 
algorithms, dynamic programming, BDI agents, etc.). 
However, machine learning is currently one of the most widely adopted 
and used methodologies for various applications, especially deep learning 
with its different techniques (e.g., supervised, semi-supervised, 
unsupervised, self-supervised learning). We will focus in this guide 
mainly on the problems we face when developing applications that use 
this methodology. 
Problems and side effects that arise from techniques such as 
reinforcement learning (Amodei et al., 2016), and risks related to 
potential advanced AI systems created by machine learning (Hubinger et 
al., 2019), will not be addressed in this guide.  
As much as reinforcement learning has not yet “reached the 
mainstream,” it is definitely a methodology capable of generating 
intelligent solutions, being the closest paradigm to what we may come to 
call “genuine AI” or “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI).2  
Certain advances are still needed to make reinforcement learning the new 
paradigm for machine learning solutions (e.g., efficient methods for 
developing reward functions or improving sampling efficiency). These 
advances are steadily and progressively being achieved (Ye et al., 2021). 
However, problems related to reinforcement learning (e.g., reward 
hacking, safe exploration, correctability) may soon manifest themselves 
in real-world applications. 
However, such problems will not be the focus of this work. Here we will 
take a “short-term” view of problems involving AI ethics and safety, i.e., 
problems we face today, with the systems we own and use. 
Systems created by machine learning (specifically supervised learning) 
learn statistical inference models based on observed datasets, in order to 
generalize their classifications/predictions/decisions to new data. 
 
2 In fact, for researchers such as Silver et al. (2021), the generic goal of maximizing 
reward may be enough to produce most of the intelligent behaviors studied in artificial 
and natural intelligence. 
 
However, these systems can often create models that carry various types 
of biases or even act in undesirable ways:  
• Facial recognition systems may exhibit racist biases (Lohr, 2018; 
Nunes, 2019); 
• NLP (Natural Language Processing) systems can have sexist and 
misogynistic biases (Wolf et al., 2017; Balch, 2020); 
• Classification systems may discriminate against members of the 
LGBTQ+ community (Wang & Kosinski, 2017; Agüera y Arcas et 
al., 2018). 
Let us explore further the example that concerns racial discrimination: 
in October 2019, the then-current Minister of Justice Sergio Moro 
presented Ordinance No. 793 as a way to modernize Brazilian police 
forces. Nunes (2019) points out that since the implementation of such 
systems, the black population has been disproportionately affected. In 
2019, 90.5% of individuals arrested caught by facial recognition and 
video-monitoring systems were black, the state of Bahia leading the 
number of arrests through these new technologies (51.7%), followed by 
Rio de Janeiro (31.7%), Santa Catarina (7.3%), Paraíba (3.3%) and Ceará 
(0.7%).   
According to a report made available by the Criminal Defense Coordinator 
and the Access to Justice Studies and Research Directorate of the Rio de 
Janeiro Public Defender's Office,3 between June 1, 2019, and March 10, 
2020, there were at least 58 cases of mistaken image recognition, 
resulting in wrongful charges and even the imprisonment of innocent 
individuals. Of all those wrongfully accused, 70% were black.  
 
3 Public Defender's Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro. 
http://www.defensoria.rj.def.br/uploads/imagens/d12a8206c9044a3e92716341a99b
2f6f.pdf.  
But why is this so? 
A simplistic answer would be, “The answer is in the data. The data we 
use is skewed.” However, a more truthful answer would be, “It's a complex 
problem.”  
There is much that we still do not understand about such systems. At 
the 2017 NIPS conference (Conference on Neural Information Processing 
Systems), Ali Rahimi4 raised an important point about the current state 
of the Machine Learning research field: “machine learning has become 
alchemy.” “In the old days” (i.e., before deep learning became the 
paradigm), techniques such as linear regression, logistic regression, 
support vector machine, guaranteed efficient and interpretable solutions. 
However, we were not able to use such methodologies for more complex 
problems (e.g., computer vision). 
However, it is important to remember that, as much as machine learning 
generates statistical inference models, machine learning is not like 
statistics. In machine learning, we have many hypotheses and few 
theorems. This is why machine learning is closer to a discipline like 
engineering than mathematics. We figure out what works by trial and 
error. We don't yet have theorems that allow us to rigorously verify the 
behavior of such systems and thus make predictions about how they 
might behave in the future (OOD - “out-of-distribution”). 
In Ali Rahimi's words: 
Alchemy is not bad. There is a place for alchemy. Alchemy 
“worked.” Alchemists invented metallurgy, ways to dye 
textiles, our modern glass making processes and 
medications. Then again alchemists also believed that 
could cure diseases with leeches and transmute base 
metals into gold. For the physics and chemistry of the 
1700s to usher in the sea change in our understanding of 
the universe that we now experience, scientists had to 
dismantle 2,000 years’ worth of alchemical theories. If 
 




you're building photo-sharing systems alchemy is okay. 
But we're beyond that now. We're building systems that 
govern healthcare and mediate our civic dialogue. We 
influence elections. I would like to live in a society whose 
systems are built on top of verifiable, rigorous, thorough 
knowledge and not on alchemy. 
In other words, machine learning still needs more theoretical study. 
However, it is not clear that the industry will slow down its practical 
progress and development for the sake of caution and formalization of the 
theories that underlie the creation of its products. And that creates 
problems. 
Thus, we believe that it is necessary to create and formalize a new agent 
to operate within organizations and companies focused on developing 
technologies and solutions that use these types of systems. We need 
security engineers and ethicists who specialize in machine learning, i.e., 
agents responsible for preventing and mitigating the possible side effects 
of systems created by machine learning.)  
Such an actor would be responsible for helping to implement security 
measures during the entire life cycle of such systems to ensure that 
certain ethical principles are respected and implemented during the 
development, deployment, and monitoring of such systems. 
To meet this need, one of the responses proposed by the community 
involved in the field of Artificial Intelligence Ethics, such as government 
institutions, private corporations, academic institutions, civil societies, 
professional associations, and NGOs, has been the publication of several 
principled governance mechanisms. These mechanisms can be defined 
as codes of ethics, guidelines, among other similar governance 
instruments, that is, normative documents based on ethical principles 
(Russell et al., 2015; Boddington, 2017; Goldsmith & Burton, 2017; 
Floridi et al., 2018; Greene et al., 2019).  
AI Ethics, as much as it is a relatively new field of Ethics,5 has enough 
literature that meta-analyses of the field have been conducted (Jobin et 
al., 2019; Hagendorff, 2020; Fjeld et al., 2020). These meta-analyses 
point out that there is a convergence towards a certain group of 
commonly held ethical principles (values):  
Values Description 
Transparency 
This principle points out one of the biggest deficits 
in contemporary Machine Learning techniques. 
While humans expect explanations they can 
understand, machine learning algorithms operate 
on complex statistical computations that defy 
simple translations, making them “opaque” 
(Mittelstadt et al., 2019). 
Justice/Equity 
Issues of fairness include problems of equal 
treatment and fair distribution of benefits. This 
principle is generally worked out in the literature 
through algorithmic definitions of fairness and 
equity (e.g., Statistical/Demographic Parity, 
Predictive Parity, Equalized Probabilities) 
(Galhotra et al., 2017; Verma & Rubin, 2018). 
Privacy 
Data is like coal for the AI industry. And the big 
tech companies (Google, Amazon, Facebook), are 
the new “coal mines” of the 21st century. The 
abundance of data we produce daily guarantees 
an almost inexhaustible source of information for 
training AI systems. However, the use of personal 
data without consent is one of the main concerns 
found in the literature (Ekstrand et al., 2018). 
Accountability 
How to make the AI industry accountable for its 
technologies. For example, in the case of 
autonomous vehicles, what kind of guarantees 
and responsibilities should companies developing 
autonomous vehicles provide to their customers 
and society at large (Maxmen, 2018)? 
Reliability 
Reliability is an ethical principle close to 
transparency. This principle defends the idea that 
AI systems should be robust. Depending on the 
type of model, and context that such a model is 
embedded in (e.g., automating judicial system 
 
5 According to Jobin et al. (2019), less than 20% of all AI Ethics documents reviewed in 
their meta-analysis (84) are more than four years old. According to the NGO 
AlgorithmWatch (2020), their Global Inventory of AI Ethics Guidelines contains 173 
documents. None of these documents predate the year 2013. Of these documents, only 
two have their origin tied to South Africa and South Asia (no documents produced by 
Latin America are listed). 
 
decision-making), it is of paramount importance 
that such systems are resilient to, for example, 
adversarial attacks (Krafft et al., 2020). 
Beneficence/Non-
Maleficence 
This principle advocates that artificial intelligence 
be used to promote “Good.” Since “Good” is a 
difficult concept to specify, many consider non-
maleficence (e.g., AI should not cause harm) as a 
better specification. This principle is very close to 
what we call AI Safety (Amodei et al., 2016). 
Freedom/Autonomy 
This principle advocates the idea that 
freedom/autonomy (i.e., the experience that we 
own and are responsible for our own choices and 
preferences) is fundamental to human 
psychological well-being. AI systems should not 
remove our autonomy, but rather empower it 
(Calvo et al., 2020). 
Dignity 
This principle refers to the inherent value (and 
inherent vulnerability) of the human individual. 
Something that should be (human dignity) 
inviolable. AI systems should be developed to 
promote an ecosystem that ensures that 
individuals are seen, heard, listened to, treated 
fairly, recognized, understood, and feel safe 
(Ruster, 2021). 
Sustainability 
This principle can be understood as a form of 
“intergenerational justice.” Sustainability 
describes our ethical obligation to future 
generations. An obligation to secure and preserve 
their living conditions, by, for example, through 
the careful use of our natural resources (Krafft et 
al., 2020). 
Solidarity* 
This principle can be understood as sharing the 
prosperity created by AI. We must implement 
mechanisms to redistribute the increased 
productivity, share new burdens and 
responsibilities, and make sure that AI will not 
increase the inequality of our world (Luengo-Oroz, 
2019). 
Diversity* 
This principle can be understood as the defense 
and valorization of the different ways in which the 
human entity can come to express itself, by any 
group or identity it wishes. AI systems should be 
developed in a way that protects and values our 
diversity (AIRES at PUCRS, 2021). 
Inclusion* 
AI systems should be developed in such a way as 
to “include,” not exclude. This principle advocates 
for the welcoming of all forms in which the human 
entity can come to express itself, regardless of 
specific affiliations, groups, or identities (AIRES at 
PUCRS, 2021). 
* Regarding the principles of Solidarity, Diversity, and Inclusion: these are the principles 
least raised by the current state of AI Ethics. However, we feel it necessary to point them 
out as important and include them within this short and incomplete list. 
At the same time, in 2017, the IEEE Standards Association published the 
second version of the document “Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for 
Prioritizing Human Well-being With Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous 
Systems.” Such a document suggests several methodologies to guide 
ethical research in projects seeking artificial intelligence development, 
upholding the human values outlined by the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The document even guides certain 
guidelines and recommendations for the development of “ethically aligned 
AI” (73-82). 6 
However, there are several criticisms raised against this type of abstract 
principle-based methodology (Principialism), which without a translation 
into the practice of intelligent system development, risks being 
categorized as mere “ethics theater,” i.e., a moral discourse with little (or 
no) intention of solving real-world problems (Calo, 2017; Rességuier & 
Rodrigues; 2020; Corrêa & De Oliveira; 2021). 
In the words of Mittelstadt (2019, p. 503): 
Statements based on vague normative concepts hide 
points of political and ethical conflict. “Justice,” “dignity,” 
and other abstract concepts are examples of “essentially 
contested concepts” that have many possible conflicting 
meanings that require contextual interpretation [...] At 
best, this conceptual ambiguity allows for a context-
sensitive specification of ethical requirements for AI. At 
worst, it masks fundamental principled disagreements and 
 
6 The IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems. Ethically 
Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and 
Intelligent Systems, Version 2. IEEE, 2017. http://standards. 
ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/autonomous_ systems.html. 
 
leads AI ethics toward moral relativism. At the very least, 
any compromise reached so far around fundamental 
principles for AI ethics does not reflect a meaningful 
consensus on a common practical direction for the “good” 
development and governance of AI. 
Thus, it is important to note that there are still few proposals for how we 
should implement ethical principles and normative guidelines in the 
practice of AI system development. The goal of this handbook is to try to 
bridge this gap between discourse and praxis. Between abstract 
principles and technical implementation. 
To begin this guide, in the next section, we will investigate what the 
development cycle of machine learning trained models looks like to better 











The “Life Cycle” of a Machine Learning 
System 
 
The “life cycle” of a model trained by machine learning, i.e., the design, 
creation, deployment, and monitoring of such a system, cannot be 
isolated from human interference, as such systems are designed, 
deployed, used, and monitored by humans. Ananny & Crawford (2018) 
suggest that algorithmic systems are sets of human and non-human 
actors entangled in a dynamic that generates non-deterministic effects, 
and in our opinion, this is an excellent definition.  
Thus, to understand and prospect the ethical implications of such 
systems, it is necessary to understand how the whole system functions, 
i.e., the total set of human and non-human actors that compose it. 
Systems created by machine learning (especially supervised learning and 
its variants) generally follow the following cycle: 
• Data collection and pre-processing: before any analysis or learning 
can take place, we need data. The dataset for training is usually 
created from two assumptions: (1) you assume that your outputs 
can be predicted given your inputs; (2) you assume that the 
available data is informative enough to learn the relationship 
between inputs and outputs. Sometimes we can accept such 
assumptions (e.g., shoe size is generally related to an individual's 
height), and sometimes we cannot (e.g., the historical value of some 
asset, such as Apple stock, may not correlate with its future value). 
If you want to create a system to predict the chance that a patient 
will develop diabetes, you could create a database based on the 
users of the public health network that have type 2 diabetes. You 
could use certain characteristics (features) that you believe are 
 
correlated with type 2 diabetes (e.g., weight, age, BMI, family 
history, physical activity) together with samples of people who have 
type 2 diabetes (labeled data) to create a model that, given the input 
values you have established, predicts the chance that this 
individual will or will not develop type 2 diabetes. Almost 80% of 
all the work of a machine learning engineer is in creating a good 
dataset; 
• Model Development: after defining our dataset, we divide it into 
three groups: training, validation, and testing. It is considered 
“good conduct” (if not common sense) not to mix the training 
dataset with the dataset that will be used for validation and testing. 
What we want is a model that generalizes its predictions to new 
samples, not a model that simply memorizes the presented data 
(i.e., overfitting). After this split, we define our model architecture 
(e.g., feedforward neural network), our objective function (e.g., 
predicting the individuals most susceptible to type 2 diabetes), our 
loss function (e.g., binary cross-entropy), optimizer (e.g., stochastic 
gradient descent), and evaluation metrics (e.g., accuracy, precision, 
recall, AUC). Next, we will iteratively adjust the parameters of our 
model (e.g., number of nodes in the hidden layer, learning rate of 
the optimizer, a different loss function) to improve the result of our 
evaluation metric on the validation data. In this step, we (re)train 
our model until we are satisfied with its result in the validation 
phase; 
• Model Evaluation: we train the model with the training portion of 
the data and evaluate its performance for parameter fitting with the 
validation portion. Then, when we are satisfied with the final 
model, we evaluate it with the testing portion of the data. This is 
when we evaluate the predictive power of our model with data the 
model has never seen before. We can also evaluate our model 
against benchmarks if these exist; 
• Post-processing: at this stage, we need to adapt the output of our 
model to the problem we are dealing with. For example, if we define 
that the output of our model (i.e., the model that infers the chance 
of an individual developing type 2 diabetes) is a probability 
measure between 0 and 1, but we want a categorical answer (i.e., 
“Yes,” “No,” “Inconclusive”), we need to estimate a decision 
threshold (e.g., more than 80% confidence equals a conclusive 
classification); 
• Model Deployment: in this stage, many adjustments should be 
made to make the model “ergonomic”, facilitating its interaction 
with its users. For example, transparency tools can be 
implemented in the model in cases where interpretability is vital 
(e.g., the VICTOR system used by the Supreme Court). Deployment 
is always a sensitive moment in the life cycle of these systems. 
Since the training environment is (usually) not a faithful 
representation of the deployment environment, 
unexpected/unwanted behavior may occur just at this stage (e.g., 
a clothing recommendation system that was naively trained in the 
summer and is unable to recommend “useful” garments during the 
winter); 
• Monitoring: After the model is deployed, it is necessary to monitor 
its behavior to ensure that the system performs the function for 
which it was developed, and does not result in any kind of behavior 
that we might consider undesirable/unsafe (e.g., a disease 
prediction model that has a low performance for a specific group 
should, in theory, be taken out of circulation and improved). 
With the development, deployment, and monitoring cycle of such a 
system defined, we will investigate in the next section “where” problems 
can arise and compromise a model created by machine learning. 
 
Sources of Problems 
 
As we can see from the previous section, many assumptions and choices 
will be made before we deploy our model to act in the real world. 
Developers, machine learning engineers, data scientists, all these actors 
will be actively influencing the form the model will take during its 
development, be it in building the datasets (training, validation, and 
testing), choosing and crafting the features (feature engineering), defining 
the model parameters, choosing the evaluation method, etc. During this 
long process, many “bad” decisions can negatively influence the final 
model. 
As mentioned in the opening section, the source of these problems is not 
simply “skewed data.” First of all, databases are not static structures, 
divorced from the social/historical contexts and intentions from which 
they arose. To mask the side effects generated by such systems as just 
“skewed data” is to obfuscate the complexity of how such systems can be 
compromised throughout their life cycle. At the same time, it is to 
obfuscate our share of responsibility for the problem.  
Suresh & Guttag (2021), in their study “Understanding Potential Sources 
of Harm throughout the Machine Learning Life Cycle,” provide a framework 
that identifies seven distinct sources of harm that can compromise the 
behavior of such systems, from data collection to deployment:  
• Historical biases: this kind of problem occurs because our world, 
as it is or was, is flawed. Thus, even if the model is a perfect 
representation of the environment, it may still generate harm 
because it represents an imperfect environment. For example, 
Brown et al. (2020, p. 36-37) report that their model of language 
(GPT-3) associates pejorative, sexist, and misogynistic adjectives 
more often with women than men (i.e., a reflection of the texts, and 
culture, that we encounter on the Internet); 
• Representation biases: This problem occurs when the data used to 
train the model does not represent the population or environment 
in which the model will operate. When training a model to predict 
the development of type 2 diabetes, there may not be enough data 
to represent all possible groups of interest (men, women, elderly, 
children, etc.). Or, image recognition software used by an 
autonomous car trained in urban environments may operate 
flawed when operating in rural regions; 
• Measurement biases: when we choose characteristics (features) to 
be used for some outcome (e.g., BMI, weight, height, family history), 
we are assuming that such a characteristic/feature is 
representative of what we want to predict or classify (type 2 
diabetes). But this is not always the case, as such “proxies” may 
only be approximations of a more complex reality. For example, if 
our model gives too much weight to the variable “BMI” for the task 
of predicting type 2 diabetes, subjects with a large amount of 
muscle (e.g., bodybuilders) might be falsely classified as potential 
developers of type 2 diabetes. “IQ” (i.e., intelligence quotient) may 
not be a good parameter for assessing academic success, which 
often depends on other factors that are difficult to measure (e.g., 
motivation, ability to relate, organizational skills); 
• Aggregation biases: This type of problem occurs when different 
groups are joined into a single dataset. However, the trained model 
does not perform efficiently with any (or none) of the groups. For 
example, it is known that men are twice as likely as women to have 
a heart attack in their lifetime. A model trained on a mixed dataset 
(i.e. without differentiating the sex of the samples) to predict the 
chance of a patient having a heart attack, may turn out to be 
inefficient with either (or both) sexes. Ideally, models should be 
trained to fit specific groups (when necessary); 
 
• Learning biases: the choice of the loss function (e.g., root mean 
square error, binary cross-entropy, categorical cross-entropy) and 
performance metric (e.g., accuracy, precision, recall, AUC) can 
influence the type of output our model generates, and how we 
interpret its performance. For example, if we have an application 
for which false-negative classifications can generate a “large cost” 
(e.g., false negative for HIV), perhaps we should not use accuracy 
to measure its performance, but rather recall; 
• Evaluation biases: the data used in the testing (or test-benchmark) 
phase does not always represent a good evaluation metric for the 
domain in which the model will be deployed. For example, you may 
have developed a face recognition model with excellent performance 
in your testing phase. However, the benchmark you used has a low 
representation of the brown population (e.g., 4%), and the model 
will perform in a domain where much of the population is brown 
(e.g., Brazil); 
• Deployment biases: this kind of problem occurs when the model is 
used differently (or beyond) what it was originally developed to do. 
Many of the models created by machine learning are not “fully 
autonomous,” but are found as part of a socio-technical process 
where human intentions and desires are part of it. For example, 
risk assessment systems are used in the American penal system to 
predict the likelihood that a person will commit a future crime (i.e., 
criminal recidivism). However, a perverse instantiation of this tool 
would be to use it to determine the length of a sentence based on 
the likely risk of recidivism (Collins, 2018). 
Below is a diagram describing the life cycle of a model developed by 





Sources of problems during the development and deployment of a model (Suresh & 
Guttag, 2021). 
It is important to note that depending on the application of a model, the 
types of problems mentioned above will not manifest themselves in any 
detrimental way, making an “ethical analysis” unnecessary. For example, 
a model created to optimize industrial processes (e.g., quality control, 
inventory control), which do not affect people's lives in a significant way, 
does not require the same level of analysis that models that interact 
 
directly with people do. In other words, there is, for example, no “breach 
of privacy” in situations where a model must classify a fruit as “fit for 
consumption” or “not fit for consumption.”  
However, if during an initial inspection it is revealed that there are ethical 
issues to consider, the organization and developers responsible should 
conduct a full ethical evaluation of the model.  
In short, context is what will define the standard. There is no “One True 
Moral Theory” that applies to every application of an algorithmic model. 
In the next section, now that we know several types of problems that can 
interfere with the development and deployment of a model created by 
machine learning, we will explore some of the definitions of algorithmic 









Defining “Fairness” in Machine Learning 
 
Taking all the examples of biases cited in the last section, what we would 
ideally like to do is develop a “fair” model, i.e., a model that performs its 
function free of discrimination and bias. There is a growing body of work 
on “fair algorithms” being published, and we can define “fair algorithms,” 
in the context of machine learning, as a model that satisfies some 
particular notion of “fairness.” 
However, depending on how we formalize “fairness” or “justice,” different 
decisions/classifications/predictions will be defined as “fair.” These 
decisions may conflict with other particular formalizations of “what we 
mean by fair”: 
• Fairness means achieving parity among the demographic groups in 
a population; 
• Fairness means satisfying the preferences of the demographic 
groups in a population; 
• Fairness means equally benefiting all demographic groups in a 
population; 
• Fairness means impacting (i.e., opposite of benefiting) equally all 
demographic groups in a population; 
• Fairness means judging from behind the veil of ignorance; 
What would be the best definition to apply in the context of machine 
learning? First, we need to define fairness, in its various forms, in 
statistical terms, i.e., how the statistical inferences of a model can be 
performed in a way that respects specific notions of fairness. Let's look at 
some of these possible definitions: 
• Veil of Ignorance: a model satisfies this condition if all the sensitive 
attributes (i.e., attributes for which non-discrimination should be 
established) of its samples are not made explicit to the model, i.e., 
 
the model has no access to information such as race, ethnicity, 
color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, etc.  
This approach can be traced back to the definition of Justice advocated 
by John Rawls (1999) in his seminal work “A Theory of Justice.” One of 
the problems with this approach is that we need to define which proxies 
can be used by a model to identify (and discriminate) samples. Even if 
sensitive attributes are veiled from the model, a predictor could still infer 
and discriminate marginalized populations based on non-sensitive 
information. For example, if a bank uses a model to assist in evaluating 
credit card applications, and the city/region where this back provides 
service has a certain level of racial segregation in its distribution of 
residents, non-sensitive attributes (e.g., zip code) could be used to 
discriminate against individuals living in certain locations.  
Moreover, certain studies point out that the veil of ignorance may turn 
out to be more discriminatory than “fairness by awareness” (i.e., when we 
take sensitive attributes into account in a judgment) (Sen, 1990; Bonilla-
Silva, 2003; Fryer et al., 2008). At the same time, this approach seems to 
go against principles of “repair and relief” of historically marginalized 
populations. 
• Fairness by Awareness: a model satisfies this condition if the model 
produces the same output for similar individuals. That is, if two 
samples have a minimum number of similar features, both samples 
will be classified equally. 
This definition is a more elaborate variation of the previous criterion (“Veil 
of Ignorance”), where we define a model as “fair” that treats similar 
individuals similarly. To put this definition into practice, we first need to: 
(1) define a distance metric for us to measure the similarity between two 
samples; and (2) define what is the minimum distance for two samples to 
be similarly classified.  For example, a possible distance metric 𝑓 could 
define that the distance between two subjects, 𝑖 and 𝑗, as 0 if all non-
sensitive attributes are identical and 1 if any non-sensitive attributes are 
different. 
However, it is not at all clear how to create a function that takes as an 
argument the features of two samples and calculates their distance 
without generating discriminative classifications. By this definition, we 
just “pass the problem” of making a fair classification from the model to 
the distance metric.  
• Counterfactual equality: a model satisfies the counterfactual 
equality condition if its ranking is unchanged, even if the sensitive 
attributes of the sample were different. 
This is the same thing as saying that the model is “fair” if, for example, it 
authorizes the opening for a line of credit for subject A, who possesses 
the sensitive attribute 𝑖, even if subject A possessed the sensitive 
attribute 𝑗. 
To implement a model that satisfies this condition, we first need to 
determine what a “counterfactual influence” would be (i.e., how sensitive 
attributes can influence non-sensitive attributes to determine the 
outcome of a classifier). One way we can do this type of analysis is by 
using causal graphs/diagrams (Pearl, 1995; Kilbertus et al., 2017). 
 
In the graph above, sensitive attributes (e.g., race) could be inferred by 
“Address,” which would act as a proxy for sensitive attributes in a city 
where racial segregation occurs in the distribution of its residents. Thus, 
we can define that a causal model is fair by counterfactual equality if no 
sensitive attributes can influence a proxy that directly affects the final 
decision (𝑃) of the model (the model above does not satisfy this condition). 
 
To satisfy this fairness condition, it would be necessary not to use (as 
classification features) all the descendants of nodes containing sensitive 
attributes. However, in real applications, the vast majority of sensitive 
attributes are nodes whose descendants span through almost the entire 
causal graph. 
• Statistical/demographic parity: a model satisfies the 
statistical/demographic parity condition if the model can generate 
equal, or nearly equal, results for members of groups with different 
sensitive attributes. 
Statistical parity for groups can be referred to as a notion of egalitarian-
collectivist distributive justice (Hofstede et al., 2010; Hirose, 2014). One 
criticism raised against this formalization is that by imposing statistical 
parity on our model, we may generate: (1) a model that produces incorrect 
results (i.e., the model will prioritize statistical parity over its 
performance); or (2) the model may come to discriminate against more 
“qualified” individuals (Luong et al., 2011, Dwork et al., 2012). For 
example, a model designed to aid in the selection process for a job 
opening might prioritize statistical parity over other relevant attributes 
(e.g., “gender over resume”).  
Thus, we must understand that imposing fairness metrics (e.g., 
statistical/demographic parity) should be seen as a compromise between 
“performance” and “fairness,” since we will be intentionally introducing 
impartialities that deviate from the original data distribution. 
For certain applications, this would not be desirable. For example, a 
sentiment classifier (a common machine learning task in NLP) is biased 
to classify words such as “suicide,” “depression,” “loneliness,” as text 
containing negative sentiment, and that is desirable. However, models 
biased in favor, or detriment, of social classes, races, or genders, are not 
desirable. 
We can also define statistical parity in terms of predicted outcome: 
• Predictive Parity: A model satisfies the predictive parity condition if 
the model's precision is equal across different groups. That is, if 
the model determines with 90% accuracy that an individual is a 
“good candidate for a loan” (i.e., the loan will not be harmful to the 
bank or the subject), this measure of accuracy must be 
independent of the value of sensitive attributes. 
One of the difficulties in implementing a model that satisfies the condition 
of predictive parity between different groups is that groups are not always 
equally represented in datasets. For example, of the large public face 
image datasets (e.g., UTKFace, CelebA, LFWA+), there is a strong bias in 
favor of Caucasian faces, while other races (e.g., indigenous) are 
significantly underrepresented (Kärkkäinen & Joo, 2019). For a model to 
achieve balanced performance across groups, there must be enough 
examples for the system to learn a good model. 
• Equalized Odds: this algorithmic fairness condition can be 
interpreted as an extension of the predictive parity condition. A 
model that satisfies this condition is a model that has an equally 
true and false positive rate, regardless of the value of sensitive 
attributes. 
This means that the chance of an individual with a good credit score 
receiving a positive rating (i.e., being approved for a new credit card), and 
the chance of an individual with a bad credit score receiving a positive 
rating, is equal and independent of the group (i.e., sensitive attributes) to 
which that individual belongs. In other words, both members of 𝑖 and 𝑗 
have the same chance of receiving a positive rating (whether it is correct 
or not). 
Certainly, these are not the only existing definitions of algorithmic 
fairness, and other definitions can be found in the literature on “machine 
learning fairness” (Chouldechova, 2016; Hardt et al., 2016, Corbett-
Davies et al., 2017; Galhotra et al., 2017; Kilbertus et al., 2017; Verma & 
 
Rubin, 2018, Gajane & Pechenizkiy, 2018, Mehrabi et al., 2019). 
However, the point we wish to make clear is:  
• There is no single definition of what is fair.  
Organizations concerned with developing “fair” AI systems (i.e., capable 
of mitigating the emergence of certain biases throughout the life cycle of 
the model created) must first establish which definition of “fair” best 
applies to the problem their model will tackle. Certain definitions may be 
more applicable to certain contexts. For some applications, it may be 
important to “obscure” all forms of sensitive attributes, while for others, 
it may be better to prioritize statistical parity over classification efficiency. 
In short, the correct definition of “fairness” depends on the context. 
However, wouldn't it be possible for us to apply all the suggested 
definitions as fairness constraints to the same model? Unfortunately, 
there are limitations on how we can constrain the predictions of 
statistical inference models. Let us look at some of these constraints in 







Impossibility Results in AI Ethics 
 
Many of the definitions presented in the last section may seem similar or 
variants of one of the same general goal, i.e., that the inferences of a 
probabilistic model be independent of certain sensitive attributes, such 
as gender, race, sexual orientation, etc. However, when we try to calibrate 
our model so that it satisfies multiple notions of statistical equality and 
parity, we arrive at certain impossibility results.  
Since 2016, thanks to the work of Kleinberg et al. (2016), we already know 
that certain notions of justice, in the context of probabilistic 
classifications, are incompatible with each other, i.e., we cannot satisfy 
all of them at the same time. There are certain inevitable arbitrages 
between different definitions, regardless of the specific context and 
method used to arrive at a probabilistic classification. 
In machine learning, when we design a model for 
classification/prediction purposes, we use a group (𝑥𝑖) of labeled data (𝑦𝑖) 
to train our model. The goal that our model must fulfill is to find a 
function 𝑓: 𝑋 → 𝑌 that approximates the true joint distribution of samples 
and labels (𝑋 × 𝑌). Thus, the goal of the model can be defined in terms of 
minimizing empirical risk, i.e., decreasing the gap between the model's 
predictions and the true labels of its samples. 
Statistical modeling for empirical risk minimization can be thought of as 
a condition orthogonal to any notion of fairness that causes the model to 
deviate from the true joint distribution of samples and labels. In other 
words, standard loss minimization (e.g., binary cross-entropy) and 
optimization (e.g., stochastic gradient descent) techniques seek to 
minimize empirical risk, not to adhere to particular notions of fairness. 
Thus, a fair classifier would narrow the gap between “fair predictions” 
and “empirical predictions” (Saravanakumar, 2021).  
 
When designing a fair classifier, the problem we want to avoid is that 
sensitive attributes interfere with the classification of our model. We can 
say that a sensitive attribute (𝑎) is a possible source of bias, only if such 
an attribute is statistically correlated with the prediction (?̂?) of our model 
(𝑃𝑎[?̂?] = 𝑃(𝑎)). Otherwise, the sensitive attribute will not interfere with the 
inference of the model in question because it is not correlated with the 
prediction, or true value, of the sample being considered.   
From what we can see in the last section, defining a “fair” statistical 
inference algorithm is equivalent to defining some calibration criterion 
that fits any of the various definitions of “fairness,” “equity,” and 
“equality” found in the literature. The impossibility results of Kleinberg et 
al. (2016) apply to three of these definitions, dictating that barring ideal 
cases, no statistical inference model can satisfy the following three 
calibration criteria: 
A. Calibration within groups: a model satisfies this condition if for each 
possible group (e.g., 𝑖 and 𝑗), the model classifies the members of 𝑖 
and 𝑗 that satisfy the positive condition into a given class with the 
same chance, i.e., both individuals from group 𝑖 and 𝑗 that have 
the same probability of being positively classified, will have the 
same chance of being positively classified by the model.  
B. Balance for the positive class: a model satisfies this condition if the 
chance of an individual being classified to the positive class is 
independent of his or her group. A model that does not satisfy this 
condition is a model that privileges (i.e., positively classifies with a 
greater chance) members of one group (𝑖) over the other (𝑗). 
C. Balance for the negative class: this is the inverse condition of the 
previous definition. A model satisfies this condition if the chance of 
an individual being classified as a negative class is independent of 
his group. Corollary, a model that does not satisfy this condition is 
a model that privileges members of one group over the other. 
Criterion A can be defined as a more restricted form of the 
statistical/demographic parity condition. Criteria B and C can be 
interpreted as versions of the Predictive Parity and Equalized Odds 
conditions. These three definitions of algorithmic justice are some of the 
most accepted and studied by the AI Ethics community, and these are 
also the victims of this impossibility result. 
According to the impossibility theorems of Kleinberg et al. (2016), there 
are only two exceptions to this rule: 
• Ideal Cases: the only examples of problems in which there is a 
probabilistic classification that satisfies fairness conditions A, B, 
and C, are when: (1) the inference model is perfect (i.e., the joint 
distribution of 𝑋 × 𝑌 is perfectly known, and 𝑃[?̂?] is equal to 0 or 1 
for all 𝑥𝑖); or (2) the inference model has equal base rates (i.e., the 
chance of a sample being classified as belonging to positive and 
negative class is equal).7 
Unfortunately, both ideal cases are not the “norm” in terms of 
probabilistic models created by machine learning. If we knew the perfect 
distribution of all possible samples, we would not need machine learning 
because we have access to an oracle. And a model with an equal balance 
ratio between negative and positive classes will generally not represent 
the true data distribution. Various situations and applications cannot be 
decided by the toss of a fair coin (even if that is, “statistically,” the fairest 
thing to do). 
Let's use again our example of an individual who goes to a bank to try to 
open a new line of credit, and one of his evaluations will be performed by 
 
7 Kleinberg et al. (2016) also proved that their impossibility results can be extended to 
situations where we only approximate the ideal cases, i.e., the model only approximates 
a perfect prediction with an error ε > 0, or the model only approximates an equal ratio 
between the total balance between negative and positive classes, for any δ > 0.  
 
 
a statistical inference model (e.g., a supervised machine learning model), 
which will result in his “credit score”. 
The sampling distribution is probably not uniform, i.e., the environment 
is not made up of 50% individuals with a good credit score (i.e., a new 
line of credit would be beneficial to both the bank and the individual) and 
50% individuals with a bad credit score (i.e., a new line of credit would 
be harmful to both the bank and the individual). Similarly, the 
distribution of sensitive attributes between the two classes (for simplicity, 
we are imagining a binary classification problem) is probably not uniform 
(i.e., perhaps the actual distribution of “individuals with a good credit 
score” favors women). 
Thus, what the impossibility results tell us is that except the two types 
of ideal cases, at least two of the following undesirable properties must 
hold, because no probabilistic inference model can simultaneously satisfy 
calibration criteria A, B and C, i.e., we are only able to satisfy one criterion 
at the expense of two: 
1) Statistical/demographic parity violation: the results of the 
classifier/predictor/model are systematically biased upwards or 
downwards for at least one group; 
2) Predictive Parity Violation: the rate of ratings for the positive class 
is systematically biased, assigning higher probability to the positive 
class for at least one group; 
3) Equalized Probability Violation: the rate of ratings for the negative 
class is systematically biased, assigning a higher probability for the 
negative class for at least one group. 
The tradeoff between these three conditions is not necessarily a machine 
learning problem, but a fact about probabilistic classification problems 
that seek to model data produced by real-world phenomena. This 
impossibility should not be attributed to a lack of model capability, but 
rather to the constraints of the data generation regime and the conditions 
of equality and fairness that we stipulate. Another way to interpret this 
result is that the algorithmic justice problem is not exactly a statistical 
problem, but a sociological problem, since the discrepancies and biases 
embedded in the data are merely reflections of an unequal and imperfect 
society. 
Thus, a machine learning engineer who builds models for applications 
with possible social impacts should be prepared to deal with this 
phenomenon. To choose a metric of fairness is also to choose which 
violations we are willing to do. 
There is no general solution to this problem. It is the responsibility of the 
developers and supervisors of a project that aims to create such models 
to define by which ruler to norm their system. However, what should be 
done is: (1) investigating the limitations and possible biases of the model 
generated; (2) making such information available (transparently) to those 
who will use (be impacted by) such technologies. 
A bank manager assisted by an AI model should know if this is the case, 
that his model has certain biases in its decision making. Such biases, 
and the measures and choices that have been made to mitigate their 
possible side effects, should be explicitly made available to the operator. 
For example, perhaps the model could come with a “package insert” or 
“letter” explaining the possible biases that the model may exhibit. When 
a rating for sample X is made, perhaps the model could result in not only 
a rating but also a warning (“Warning! This model tends to generate a 
systematically biased False Negative percentage for samples with the 
following sensitive attribute: 'Divorced'.”).  
In the next section we will start to present some possible solutions (tools 




The Role of the AI Safety Engineer 
 
Imagine you are in charge of the AI ethics and safety division of a 
company that produces solutions and products through machine 
learning techniques. Your duty is to (1) ensure that the models generated 
by your company follow certain safety protocols; (2) ensure that possible 
side effects are detected and predicted before the model is deployed to act 
in the environment; and (3) monitor the behavior of the model “in the 
wild.” The problems cited in the last section are some of the concerns that 
should be on your radar: 
• How are the various forms of oppression and historical biases 
characteristic of the context where the model will be deployed (i.e., 
historical biases) structured in our social and political fabric? 
• Is the data used for training an accurate representation of the 
population or domain of interest? Are there important but 
marginalized groups that are not present in this dataset (i.e., 
representation bias)? 
• Are the chosen labels and characteristics good proxies for what we 
are interested in measuring/classifying/predicting (i.e., 
measurement bias)? 
• Given the problem we face, would it be correct to aggregate different 
groups? Or do we need to treat each group concerning its 
specificities (i.e., aggregation biases)? 
• How can the model be used for purposes other than those defined 
by the developers (i.e., deployment biases)? What types of 
adversarial attacks is the model most susceptible to?  
• What fairness metrics are being followed? What algorithmic 
fairness conditions does the model violate (i.e., 
Statistical/demographic parity, Predictive parity, Equalized 
probabilities)? Are algorithmic fairness constraints something 
necessary for the application in question? 
Understanding where intervention is needed and how feasible it is can 
inform discussions about how damage can be mitigated versus when it 
is better not to deploy a system at all. Let's start exploring some 














Translational Tools  
 
Translational tools, in the context of AI Ethics, are methodologies to help 
developers “translate” abstract, high-level, ethical principles into 
practical, concrete implementations. Floridi and Taddeo (2016) suggest 
that this type of tool can be thought of as a diagnostic methodology, i.e., 
a way to assess whether a given model is aligned with certain ethical 
principles espoused and defined by developers. 
We will define these types of tools as “qualitative”, and in the next sections 
we will present the following diagnostic tools: 
• FAIR (Findability, Accessibility, Interoperability, and Reusability); 
• Digital Catapult AI Ethics Framework; 









Building a Fair Dataset (FAIR)  
 
When the problems in our model can be traced back to the dataset we 
used, a possible solution is to correct such a dataset so that its sampling 
distribution, concerning sensitive attributes, respects some particular 
condition of fairness that we wish to implement. 
For example, FairFace8 is a dataset of faces with a balanced distribution 
across genders, races, and ages, containing 108,501 images. Kärkkäinen 
and Joo (2021) demonstrated that models trained with FairFace are 
significantly more accurate than other models trained with sets such as 
UTKFace, CelebA, LFWA+, showing consistent performance across 
groups (i.e., predictive parity across race, gender, and age). 
To help developers identify and choose fair datasets, we can use the 
methodology proposed by Wilkinson et al. (2016): FAIR. The FAIR 
methodology is a tool for developers to evaluate certain characteristics of 
the dataset they intend to use, these being: Findability, Accessibility, 
Interoperability, and Reusability. 
These principles serve to guide developers to ascertain three types of 
entities: (1) data (digital sources of information); (2) metadata 
(information about digital information); and (3) infrastructure (how the 
data and metadata are structured and indexed).9 Let's look at some of the 
recommendations made by the FAIR methodology. 
Findability, i.e., data and metadata must be easily accessible to both 
humans and computers: 
• The (meta)data is assigned a globally unique and persistent 
identifier (e.g., a repository on GitHub, the “Orcid” of the 
 
8 https://Github.com/joojs/fairface. 
9 For more information on how to implement the FAIR methodology, please visit 
https://www.go-fair.org/.   
 
responsible researcher, the “Doi” of a publication demonstrating 
the results of applications of the dataset); 
• The data are described with rich metadata (e.g., DICOM: Digital 
Imaging and Communications in Medicine is a protocol for 
processing, storing, and transmitting medical information in 
electronic form to allow, for example, medical imaging information 
to be accessible between different diagnostic equipment, imagers, 
computers, and hospitals); 
• Metadata clearly and explicitly include the identifier of the data 
they describe (e.g., the association between a metadata file and the 
dataset must be explicitly referenced in the metadata by a globally 
unique and persistent identifier); 
• The (meta)data is recorded or indexed in a searchable resource 
(e.g., the dataset can be found by a public search engine, e.g., 
Google). 
Accessibility, i.e., after the (meta)data is found, developers should know 
what procedures to use to gain access (e.g., authentication and 
authorization) to the dataset:  
• The (meta)data can be retrieved by its identifier using a 
standardized communication protocol (e.g., the dataset can be 
accessed and downloaded by an HTTP link); 
• The protocol is open, free, and universally implementable (e.g., the 
dataset is free); 
• The protocol allows an authentication and authorization procedure 
when needed (e.g., datasets must have their access conditions 
explicitly stated, e.g., authentication by phone number); 
• Metadata is accessible even when the data is no longer available 
(e.g., if the dataset can no longer be accessed by its identifier, 
metadata referring to that dataset will make it explicit that the 
dataset has “expired its useful life”). 
Interoperability, i.e., the data set must be in a format that allows its 
integration with various platforms and applications: 
• (Meta)data uses a formal, accessible, shared, and widely applicable 
language for knowledge representation (e.g., the dataset is in 
JSON-LD); 
• The (meta)data uses vocabularies that follow FAIR principles; 
• (meta)data includes qualified references to other (meta)data (e.g., 
the metadata of a dataset can reference other similar datasets). 
Reusability, i.e., data sets must be well formatted so that their use can 
be replicated in different situations: 
• The (meta)data is richly described with a plurality of accurate and 
relevant attributes (e.g., in addition to the data having self-
explanatory attributes, information such as “For what purpose was 
the data generated/collected?”, possible biases, whether the data 
is raw or processed, should be specified);  
• The (meta)data is released with a clear and accessible data use 
license (e.g., the dataset is licensed by an MIT license); 
• (Meta)data are associated with detailed provenance (e.g., the 
metadata contains a page describing the history/origin of the 
dataset); 
• The (meta)data meets domain-relevant community standards (e.g., 
datasets must be formatted in a standardized way, such as JSON-
LD, to allow for reusability). 
If you do not use a ready-made dataset, it will be your responsibility to 
ensure that the dataset generated to train your model follows these 
criteria for good behavior. Much of machine learning engineering comes 
down to building datasets. So, during this process, it is important to 
make the description of the data types and attributes being 
 
collected/used as clear and detailed as possible. Here are some extra 
recommendations: 
• Catalog the number of samples, for each sensitive attribute, that 
your set has (e.g., how many samples are male, how many are 
female, how many samples do not have the gender attribute 
declared or declare themselves non-binary. Does your dataset allow 
the entire gender spectrum to be represented?); 
• Describe the source domain of your data (e.g., were they voluntarily 
provided? Is “web crawling” for commercial purposes allowed in 
your country? How might the creation of your dataset conflict with 
the Privacy principle?); 
• Know the dataset intimately, as it will be your responsibility to 
identify potential biases before your deployment phase. Remember 
that not all biases are bad, but certain types of biases can generate 
unwanted consequences; 
• Share your findings. If we want to develop transparent systems, 
open-source projects should be the standard for the AI industry. 
Other tools, such as FAIR, can be found in the literature. Gebru et al. 
(2018) provide a similar tool to evaluate datasets used for machine 
learning. In any case, and regardless of the tool used, it is important that 
datasets are documented/analyzed such as to prevent unwanted 
consequences from occurring after such models are deployed in the real 
world. 
Reporting the results of a safety and ethics analysis is another important 
step for developers. In the same way that drugs are sold with package 
leaflets containing contraindications, dosages, and side effects, machine 
learning models must also be presented transparently. 
 
Digital Catapult AI Ethics Framework  
 
Developed by the Digital Catapult Ethics Committee,10 he Digital 
Catapult AI Ethics Framework is an interview/questionnaire 
methodology. The questionnaires cover seven concepts, where each 
concept is explored by specific questions. These questions aim to explore 
how an organization is implementing ethical concerns in its product 
development.  
The idea behind the Digital Catapult AI Ethics Framework is that by going 
through this questionnaire, possible security flaws or certain types of 
misconduct will be better explained, and developers made aware of their 
existence. The concepts worked on by this methodology, as some 
examples of its questions are:11 
Clear benefits: The benefits offered by a product must be clear and 
transparent. At the same time, the benefits should outweigh the potential 
risks associated with the product developed.  
• What are the goals, purposes, and intended applications of the 
developed product? 
• Who or what can benefit from the product? Consider all potential 
beneficiary groups, whether individual users, groups, or society 
and the environment as a whole. 
• Could these benefits change over time? 
 
10 The Digital Catapult Ethics committee seeks to translate theory in AI Ethics into 
practice. The committee is chaired by Luciano Floridi, Professor of Philosophy and 
Information Ethics at Oxford University, and director of the Digital Ethics Lab at Oxford 
University. https://migarage.digicatapult.org.uk/ethics/ethics-committee/. 




Know and manage risks: The possible risks associated with the improper 
or intended use of the product should, as far as possible, be known by 
the developers. 
• Have the risks of other foreseeable uses of the product, including 
accidental or malicious misuse of the product, been considered? 
• How can potential risks or perceived risks be communicated to 
users, potentially affected parties, purchasers, or commissioners? 
• Have all potential groups at risk, whether individual users, groups, 
or society and the environment as a whole, been considered? 
Use data responsibly: compliance with current legislation (e.g., LGPD - 
Law No. 13.709/2018),12 as well as other tools that help ensure that data 
is collected and used ethically (e.g., FAIR), are a basic starting point for 
any ethical assessment. 
• How was the data obtained and how was consent obtained? Is the 
data current? 
• Have potential biases contained in the data been examined, well 
understood, and documented? Is there a plan in place to mitigate 
them? 
• Can individuals remove themselves from the data set? Can such 
people also remove themselves from any resulting model? 
Be trustworthy: the burden of proof that your product is reliable and 
competent must be properly supported and proven by the developers. 
This burden must also be delivered in an interpretable format so that 
users are not misled or confused.  
 
12 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-
2018/2018/lei/L13709compilado.htm#art65. 
• Within the company, are there sufficient processes and tools in 
place to ensure transparency, accountability, reliability, and 
appropriateness of the product developed? 
• Is the nature of the product communicated in a way that intended 
users, third parties, and the general public can access and 
understand? 
• Who is responsible if things go wrong? Are these the right people? 
Are these people equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge 
to assume such responsibility? 
Diversity, equality, and inclusion: in a plural and diverse world, 
organizations that value principles such as diversity, equality, and 
inclusion should be the model to be followed. Thus, organizations must 
be able to foresee the possible consequences of the implementation of a 
product for a wide range of groups, with the intention that their product 
will be able to mitigate the inequalities and injustices that are structured 
in our political, cultural, and social fabric.  
• Are there processes in place to establish whether the product may 
harm the rights and freedoms of individuals or groups? 
• Does the organization have a policy on diversity and inclusiveness 
concerning recruiting and retaining staff? 
• Where do ethics fit into the company's hiring practices? For 
example, are ethical questions raised in interviews? 
Transparent communication: communication between developers (and the 
organization in general) and users, potentially affected parties, investors, 
and commissioners, should be transparent, clear, and intelligible.  At the 
same time, the communication paths between these groups should allow 
concerns and complaints to be addressed efficiently.  
• Does the organization communicate directly, clearly, and honestly 
about any potential risks of the product being supplied? 
• Does the company have a clear, easy-to-use system for third-
party/user or stakeholder concerns to be raised and addressed? 
 
• Is there a communication strategy or process in place if something 
goes wrong (e.g., request for return, recall)? 
Business model: the concept of “fair dealing” should be an integral part 
of a company's organizational culture, so that blind maximization of 
capital is not the only “normative guide” that guides and drives such an 
organization. In other words, ethical organizations should also be driven 
by maximizing “Social Good.”  
• Is environmental impact considered when choosing suppliers? 
Have options with clean energy sources been considered? 
• Has differential pricing been considered? Are there any ethical 
considerations regarding pricing strategy? 
• Are there any vulnerable groups that might receive lower prices? 
• Is there data that third parties (e.g., charities, researchers) could 
use for public benefit? 
The idea behind an interview conducted via the Digital Catapult AI Ethics 
Framework is that neglected problems and facts are brought into the light 








VCIO (Values, Criteria, Indicators, Observables) 
 
Krafft et al. (2020), through the AI Ethics Impact Group (led by the VDE 
Association for Electrical, Electronic & Information Technologies, and the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung), proposes another type of translational tool. The 
authors present the VCIO model, something that, according to the 
authors, is a unique approach in the field of AI Ethics (Krafft et al., 2020, 
p. 6). 
Like the Digital Catapult AI Ethics Framework, the VCIO model is a way 
to contextualize ethical concerns within the scope of application of a given 
model. The VCIO model is a multi-methodological framework, where AI 
systems are: (1) evaluated against a series of pre-established ethical 
principles; (2) results are distilled into an ethics label (AI Ethics Label); 
and finally (3), applications of the model are ranked using a risk matrix.  
VCIO is an approach that seeks to identify observable indicators that can 
serve as decision criteria to determine whether an ethical principle is 
being preserved or not. This approach also seeks to clarify when conflicts 
between different values exist. For example, in certain applications (e.g., 
medical research), there is a trade-off between transparency and privacy 
where it is almost impossible to satisfy both sides (i.e., full transparency 
may come to mean little privacy and vice versa). 
Thus, the VCIO approach operates on four levels: 
• Values: that which should guide our actions; 
• Criteria: that which defines whether a value (e.g., Justice) has been 
violated or not; 
• Indicators: since criteria (as well as values) cannot be directly 
observed, we need indicators that can signal whether criteria are 
being met; 
• Observable: aspects that can be observed and monitored by 
indicators. 
 
According to Krafft et al. (2020, p. 16): 
However, it is not possible to derive the lower levels 
[Indicators and Observables] from the higher ones [Values 
and Criteria] in a direct, i.e., deductive way. Instead, the 
normative load runs through all four levels and requires 
further deliberations at all levels, in the course of which 
particular instances must be negotiated in detail. [...] Since 
there are no deductive relationships between values, 
criteria, indicators, and observables [...] normative 
decisions must be made in a scientific and technically 
informed context. 
As an example, if we determine “Predictive Parity” as a criterion for 
“Fairness,” we can use the accuracy of a model as an indicator and 
monitor this performance metric concerning different groups (observable 
quantity). If we determine “Sustainability” as a value, we can use “carbon 
footprint” as a criterion, monitoring, for example, the carbon footprint 
generated to train a specific model. Or we can monitor whether a 
particular organization chooses clean energy sources to train its models 
and run its servers. 
Since there is no clear and objective way to determine criteria, indicators, 
and observables of the chosen values (we can even say that the choice of 
all these will be a normative choice by nature), the burden of proving that 
there is a correlation between what is advocated and what is monitored 
falls on the developers.  
If there are (and usually there are) conflicts between values, developers 
can rank them to prioritize (depending on the context in which a model 
will be applied) different values. For example, developers may choose to 
prioritize values whose criteria, indicators, and observables are clearer to 
monitor and quantify. If a value has no clear way of being monitored (e.g., 
Accountability), it can be used as a tie-breaker between two conflicting 
values (e.g., between breach in privacy or lack of transparency, for which 
of these violations will be easier to hold those responsible accountable? 
Which violation is likely to cause the most harm to those involved?). 
In the table below, we see the application of the VCIO model in the 
analysis of “Justice”: 
Value   Justice    
Criteria   
Evaluation of different sources of possible 
biases to ensure Fairness/Justice. 
   
Indicators 
Was the training 







Does the model have 




Yes, all potential 
model biases were 
reported. 





Yes, predictive parity is 
guaranteed. 
 
Only a few biases 
are known to the 
developers. 





Predictive parity is 
guaranteed only within 
a predetermined error 
percentage. 
 No. No. No. 
This table has been adapted and modified from one of the examples provided by Krafft 
et al. (2020, p. 22). 
Tables like this can contemplate several different values, where for each 
value we can assign more than one criterion, each with its respective 
indicators and observables (the table above is just a simplified example). 
Thus, the main idea of the VCIO model is to rank values, criteria, 
indicators, and observables, so that abstract concepts (e.g., Justice) can 
be anchored in observable variables (e.g., accuracy rates are equivalent 
 
for all groups considered by the model within a pre-established 
acceptable error limit). 
To facilitate the interpretability of the analysis proposed by the VCIO 
model the results are then condensed into an “Ethics Label,” i.e., an 
indicator that is easy to understand for citizens, users, consumers, 
legislators, or regulatory bodies.  
The label proposed by Krafft et al. (2020) includes a rating for each of the 
values contemplated by the VCIO ethical analysis. In the example below, 
the values used are Transparency, Accountability, Privacy, Fairness, 
Reliability, and Sustainability. However, the model can certainly be 
extended to contemplate other values.  
The suggested ranking is done by letters, from A to G (seven levels), where 
“A” is the highest-ranking (e.g., a model with an “A” score in Justice is a 
model where all, or most, of the criteria are met by the most stringent 
observable measures). Krafft et al. (2020) suggest seven levels so that the 
granularity of observables is better expressed (in the table above, we use 
only three).  
If we chose to use the example table in this Guide, we could choose to 
create a rating with only three levels (“A,” “B,” and “C,” or “Green,” 
“Yellow,” “Red”). Each observable would correspond to a rating (e.g., 
“Green = A”), and the final grade assigned to an AI system would be made 
by aggregating the different observable ratings. For example, a model 
might receive a “B” rating in Justice if it contains two indicators with “A” 
observables and one indicator with a “C” observable.13  
After the rating levels are defined, as well as the granularity of the 
observables, a way to aggregate such scores 
still needs to be defined. There are several 
ways to do such an aggregation procedure, 
and Krafft et al. (2020) suggest methods such 
as arithmetic average, harmonic average, and 
even the definition of minimum criteria for 
certain ratings to be achieved.14  
Another step we need to take in an ethical 
analysis is to evaluate the context and the 
potential associated risks of an application. 
As stated, there is little (if any) ethical 
analysis required when implementing an AI 
model created for industrial process 
monitoring.15 However, there are contexts 
where AI systems, from an ethical standpoint, 
should never be used. For example, a high-
risk decision, such as whether or not to turn 
off life support equipment of a brain-dead 
patient, should not (in principle) be made by 
a statistical inference model. Or, capital 
punishment (i.e., the “death penalty”) should 
never be prescribed and sentenced by an AI system. 
 
13 All model biases are known/explained (A); the model guarantees predictive parity (A); 
however, the data labeling procedure used for training the model has not been audited, 
either by internal or external assessors (C) (i.e., “A + A + C = B”). 
14 The details and nuances of the VCIO model can all be found in the original publication 
by Krafft et al. (2020). 
15 It may be necessary if such a model will cause some labor displacement, i.e., people 
will lose their jobs to AI systems. 
AI Ethics Label (Krafft et al., 2020, 
p. 13) 
 
Thus, when we analyze the context of an application it can also tell us 
the rigor of our evaluation (e.g., which observables must be met for a 
model to receive a minimum rating), whether our evaluation is necessary 
(e.g., the model does not require any ethical review), or whether the model 
should not be deployed at all (e.g., the result of the ethical review 
recommends not allowing the deployment of a certain application). 
Krafft and Zweig (2019) suggest that the risks of a given application be 
analyzed in a two-dimensional risk matrix. Risk matrices are commonly 
used for evaluating the risk level of a system. The matrix proposed by 
Krafft and Zweig (2019) has two factors: (1) the intensity of the potential 
damage; and (2) the dependence of the person(s) affected by the respective 
model. The authors divide their risk matrix into five classes, from 0 (“no 
risk”) to 4 (“model deployment should not be allowed”).16
 
 
16 According to Krafft & Zweig (2019), the risk analysis model is not designed to classify 
all possible risk contexts exhaustively. We can certainly increase the granularity of the 
risk spectrum. however, the main idea behind this tool is still meaningful, i.e., that the 
risk of a given application should be assessed before its deployment. 
 
Risk Matrix (Krafft & Zweig, 2019, p. 32). 
 
In this matrix, the risk is defined by two different axes. The vertical axis 
represents how much the decisions of a model (ADM - “algorithmic 
decision-making systems”) could affect people. Below are some questions 
that can guide us in evaluating this dimension:  
• What function is the system automating (e.g., discerning cats from 
dogs, or determining the emergency shutdown of a nuclear power 
plant)? 
• Is there any human supervision? 
• If the system malfunctions, how might this affect the parties 
involved? 
• Can the system's decisions be contested? In what way? 
While the horizontal axis represents the intensity of the potential damage 
caused by the model's outputs: 
• Could the model impact fundamental human rights? 
• What is the level of this impact (e.g., loss of a benefit, physical harm, 
loss of a life)? 
• Will the impacts be on individuals? Legal entities? Individuals or 
Organizations?  
As examples of AI models for each class, we can mention: 
• Class 0: systems for automation of industrial processes, systems 
for automation of weather forecasts, systems for product 
recommendation; 
• Class 1: recommendation systems for personalized searches on 
search engines, recommendation systems on social networks, 
recommendation systems on streaming platforms; 
• Class 2: personalized recommendation systems for jobs, 
personalized recommendation systems for services, language 
models for conversation (i.e., chatbots); 
• Class 3: recommendation systems for election advertisements, 
computer vision systems for law enforcement, criminal recidivism 
 
assessment systems, credit score assessment systems, 
autonomous vehicles; 
• Class 4: autonomous weapons, autonomous judges. 
Another example of a risk matrix is the MIL-STD-882E risk matrix 
(Military Standard 882, Department of Defense Standard Practice System 
Safety, USA).17 The MIL-STD-882E risk matrix for qualitative 
assessments has two assessment categories: Severity and Probability. 













High High Serious Average 
Probable  
(B) 
High High Serious Average 
Occasional  
(C) 
High Serious Average Low 
Remote  
(D) 
Serious Average Average Low 
Improbable  
(E) 





Severity can be defined by the following set of categories: 
• Catastrophic: risk of death (e.g., autonomous weapons attacking 
civilians); 
 
17 MIL-STD-882E, Department of Defense Standard Practice: System Safety (May 11, 
2012). http://everyspec.com/MIL-STD/MIL-STD-0800-0899/MIL-STD-882E_41682/. 
• Critical: risk of serious injury (e.g., traffic accidents caused by 
autonomous vehicles); 
• Marginal: minor damage/injury (e.g., incorrect/harmful 
classifications generated by an ADM); 
• Negligible: negligible damage/injury (e.g., your video feed does not 
contain your favorite series). 
Meanwhile, “Probability” is the estimation of the frequency of an event 
that might happen in the future (something that is often difficult, or 
impossible, to determine precisely): 
• Frequent: event that can occur frequently (e.g., one 
misclassification every 10 samples);  
• Probable: will occur several times in the life of the system (e.g., one 
misclassification every 100 samples); 
• Occasional: events that may occur at some point in the life of the 
system (e.g., one misclassification every 1,000 samples); 
• Remote: event unlikely to occur, but may still occur (e.g., one 
misclassification every 10,000); 
• Improbable: event extremely unlikely to occur (e.g., one 
misclassification every 100,000); 
• Impossible: Equals a probability of zero. 
Certainly, the examples cited above can be challenged. Given the 
ambiguous and context-dependent nature of Ethics/Safety when applied 
to complex real-world situations, arguments can be made as to which 
class an application “really” belongs to or what is the “true” level of 
severity/probability of an AI system failing to act safely. 18 However, I 
believe that what is important is not exactly the result (i.e., the “exact” 
classification of an application) but rather the deliberation process that 
will lead to that result (i.e., the ethical analysis itself). 
 
18 One wrong classification for every 1,000 samples may not seem like much, but if the 
application being evaluated makes one call per second to the model, and the model 
operates for 4 hours/day, that is 14400 calls to the model per day (~15 errors per day). 
Depending on the application, this could be considered high risk. 
 
At the same time, to optimize the regulatory processes of AI systems, a 
risk analysis (e.g., by a division of risk classes) can help define how 
rigorous our assessment should be. In this way, applications that fall into 
different risk classes should be approached differently. 
For example, we may come (as a society) to define that while applications 
involving low risk (e.g., classes 0, 1 and 2, or Eliminated, Low and 
Medium risk levels) may be audited internally (i.e., by the organization 
itself), high-risk applications (e.g., classes 3 and 4, or Serious and High) 
must also be audited by external regulatory bodies (e.g., the government, 
the ACM, the IEEE). We can also define that for AI systems to be safely 
deployed, certain application classes must obtain minimum values in 
their evaluation (e.g., all applications that fall into Class 2 must obtain a 
“B” evaluation in all evaluated values). 
Morley et al. (2021, p. 250) summarize the concept of “Ethics as a Service” 
into two types of “spheres of accountability,” which synthesize the 
concerns raised by the translational tools presented in this section: 
• Internal Accountability: Define contextually the meaning of each 
ethical principle spelled out by a Code of Ethics created by 
regulatory bodies (i.e., external accountability). Select the use of 
tools/methods from a pre-approved list of available tools/methods. 
Conduct an ethical review of the product itself at all stages of 
development and implementation, including a forward-looking 
ethical review for the future.   
• External Responsibility: Develop a Code of Ethics, review it 
regularly, and develop a process that AI developers should follow 
to contextually apply the ethical principles defined by such a code. 
Evaluate available tools/methods, and compile a pre-approved list 
of such tools for developers to use in developing their products. 
Audit the AI systems developed to ascertain their compliance to the 
current Code of Ethics (e.g., IEEE's Ethically Aligned Design; Bill 
21/2020;19 ACM's Code of Ethics20). 
Distributing the accountability of AI governance (and its Ethics 
operationalization) in this way ensures a relatively clear way of what the 
roles of the different actors in this hierarchy of services are. Whether it is 
a member of the IEEE ethics committee working towards updating the 
current Code of Ethics or a safety engineer at a company performing a 
diagnostic/evaluation of a model, each actor has their role to play.  
In the end, the translational tools presented can be used individually or 
together. They provide a general approach to implementing ethics in the 
development of intelligent systems: 
• An organization planning to develop an AI system for a specific 
application may use a questionnaire/checklist (e.g., Digital 
Catapult AI Ethics Framework) to determine the ethical risk of an 
application. Depending on the risk involved (e.g., VCIO model risk 
matrix classifies the application as “Class 0”), the process ends at 
this stage. If there are ethical issues to consider, then the 
organization performs a full assessment of its application; 
• A complete evaluation should cover all the development stages of 
an AI system (i.e., Data Collection, Model Development, Model 
Evaluation, Post-processing, Deployment, Monitoring). Each stage 
can be compromised by different sources of problems (e.g., 
collected data is biased by historical biases). Tools like FAIR, the 
Digital Catapult AI Ethics Framework, the VCIO Model, among 
others, can help developers make such problems more evident; 
• Each application context has its own specificities. Certain ethical 
values and principles may not make sense for a given application. 
 
19 Bill that establishes the foundations, principles and guidelines for the development 
and application of artificial intelligence in Brazil. 
https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1853928. 




It is up to developers (and regulatory bodies) to assess which 
ethical principles should be prioritized in a given application 
context. Ethical principles should be grounded in observable and 
verifiable quantities so that an ethical evaluation can be based on 
certain objective evaluation criteria (e.g., the VCIO Model seeks to 
accomplish this with the “Values, Criteria, Indicators and 
Observables” methodology); 
• Depending on the context, certain values are found in opposition 
(e.g., Transparency and Privacy) while other values may only be 
approximated within a context of applicability (e.g., “total” 
algorithmic justice suffers from an impossibility theorem). It is up 
to the developers to make the compromises and commitments 
made explicit in a transparent way; 
• This assessment process, depending on the risk involved by the 
application (e.g., VCIO model risk matrix, MIL-STD-882 E risk 
matrix) can be directly audited by the organization or require an 
external assessment, performed by the responsible regulatory 
bodies; 
• After the end of an evaluation, the results must be presented 
clearly and transparently to all parties involved in the use of the 
developed system (e.g., VCIO Model Ethics Seal). 
However, we must remember that certain problems may only arise after 
the implementation phase of a model. So, we cannot reduce ethical 




Are translational tools enough? 
 
As much as translational tools help bring ethical theory closer to the 
practice of intelligent systems development, we must be aware that such 
strategies alone do not guarantee that a given model/product will not 
generate unintended consequences.  
The actors responsible for administering an ethical evaluation, with their 
particular ethical notions, may not always be aligned with the “Social 
Good” (Green, 2019; Krishnan, 2019). Thus, there needs to be an effort 
to align such views. In other words, developers must have an 
understanding of what “Social Good” means. This is why ethical review 
committees should always be formed by an interdisciplinary group with 
members from various fields of knowledge (e.g., engineers, computer 
scientists, philosophers, sociologists, lawyers, etc.). 
One criticism raised against translational tools is that such methods are 
“extra-empirical” (Fazelpour & Lipton, 2020). That is, while such tools 
seek an empirical and objective basis for testing and evaluating notions 
of ethics in the development of intelligent systems, these tools themselves 
are not “per se” subject to “empirical and objective” evaluation. 
Something that, as Morley et al. (2021) point out, makes such 
methodologies subject to manipulation by those applying them. 
An ethics assessment cannot be reduced to just a “one-off” test or an 
inventory to be filled out. The role of the safety engineer in AI ethics is a 
constant process, as models must be constantly monitored. Without 
constant maintenance of these models, translational tools do not 
guarantee that an AI system will be beneficial or safe. Imagine an elevator 
company where no periodic routine evaluation and inspection of their 
products is performed, and they only sell elevators with a label saying 
“100% safe”. Would you buy (or use) one of this company's elevators? 
 
You couldn't even (legally) buy such a product because, in most 
countries, companies that do not implement a “Preventive Maintenance 
Program” for this kind of technology cannot even legally provide 
services.21 
Just as this kind of implementation is already a “standard” procedure for 
technologies such as elevators, the same must become routine for the 
maintenance of AI systems. Intelligent systems cannot be produced, 
implemented, and then abandoned by their developers. And that is what 
is expected of an organization that truly seeks to develop ethical and safe 
artificial intelligence. 
For this to be achieved, Ethics cannot be reduced to diagnostic and 
evaluation procedures but must be treated as a preventive service that 
must be regularly employed.  
Starting in the next section, we will see how security issues have been 
addressed by the literature and the private sector, and how we can 











AI Safety is in itself its own research area, with its own concerns. This 
area arose from the need to develop methods to deal with systems that 
are opaque, complex, fragile when operating outside their distribution, 
not modulable, and difficult to interpret. And such systems need their 
own special form of treatment: 
Just as, historically, security methodologies developed for 
electromechanical hardware have not generalized well to 
the new issues raised by software, we should expect that 
software security methodologies will not generalize well to 
the new complexities and dangers of Machine Learning 
(Hendrycks et al., 2021a, p. 2). 
Jurić et al. (2020), in their bibliometric review of the literature in AI 
security, suggest that the main topics being worked on in the area are: 
• Interpretability: How to interpret the decision-making of opaque 
algorithms, such as deep neural networks (Guidotti et al., 2018)? 
At the same time, how to interpret the results of our own 
interpretability tools? 
• Corrigibility: How to make potentially flawed agents, even if rational 
agents (expected utility maximizers) have a strong instrumental 
incentive to preserve their terminal goals, correctable (Soares et al., 
2015)? 
• Robustness to Adversarial Attacks: Neural networks are highly 
susceptible to adversarial attacks, i.e., attacks specially designed 
to trick them (Yuan et al., 2019). How can we protect our systems 
against these forms of attacks? 
• Safe Exploitation and Distributional shift: Generally, the training 
domain is not a perfect representation of the real domain where the 
agent will operate. How can we ensure the “safe” behavior of our 
 
models when operating in domains very different from those seen 
in their training (Amodei et al., 2016)? 
• Value Learning and Goal Specification: As we seek to integrate AI 
systems into increasingly complex environments, the tasks we 
expect such systems to solve also become more complex. Specifying 
an objective function to be optimized by an AI system in a “clear” 
way (i.e., without specification errors) is not a simple task, as 
human values and preferences can be extremely difficult to specify 
(Soares, 2016). 
Meanwhile, Hendrycks et al. (2021a) present the following technical 
problems that we encounter in machine learning. These problems tend 
to become gradually more prominent as models are implemented in 
increasingly complex and high-risk applications: 
• Robustness: The creation of models that are resilient to adversarial 
attacks and unusual situations (i.e., situations outside their 
training distribution). Currently, models trained by machine 
learning are still fragile and rigid, not operating well in dynamic 
and changing environments. In a world full of rare events 
happening all the time, such models must be extremely robust; 
• Monitoring: The detection of malicious use, malfunction, or 
unintended functionality. Just as nuclear power plants are 
monitored by HROs (high-reliability organizations), future machine 
learning systems may be monitored in the same way (e.g., 
intelligent traffic management systems controlling cities populated 
by autonomous cars). Thus, it becomes necessary to develop 
methodologies to aid the monitoring and supervision of such 
systems;  
• Alignment: Creating models that robustly optimize hard-to-specify 
goals (e.g., human values). AI systems often exhibit a certain level 
of agency (e.g., they possess and optimize goals). Something that 
differs such systems from other forms of technology. Ideally, we 
would like to create agents that “prefer” good world-states. 
However, what defines a “good world-state”? Goal proxies can be: 
(1) difficult to specify; (2) difficult to optimize; (3) fragile; and (4) 
stimulate unwanted behavior (e.g., reward hacking); 
• External Safety: Models can be embedded in insecure 
environments, such as malfunctioning software and poorly 
structured organizations. Given the fragility that models trained by 
machine learning exhibit, it is important to make their deployment 
environments secure, either by developing software resilient to 
cyberattacks or by creating governance policies aimed at making 
the deployment of such models secure.  
It is important to note that all of the cited avenues of research, with their 
particular problematics, remain open problems in AI Safety (and of 
Machine learning itself).22 
Like any emerging research field, the concerns and contributions coming 
from AI Safety have not yet penetrated the “mainstream” of the industry 
and academia. For example, if we go through the major advanced AI 
research and development (R&D) projects (i.e., projects that seek to 
advance the state-of-the-art of the field), we see that only a small minority 
conduct any kind of safety-focused research. 
In 2017, Baum (2017) identified 45 R&D projects with the goals of 
developing advanced AI. Of the 45 projects reviewed, only 13 had active 
involvement with the area of security, while the vast majority did not 
specify any type of research focused on the area of AI Safety. Fitzgerald 
et al. (2020) updated Baum's (2017) findings, increasing the project count 
 
22 For those interested, Critch & Krueger (2020) present an extensive analysis, with 
several suggestions and avenues for research, of the AI Safety field. 
 
to 72 active 2020 R&D projects focused on developing advanced AI. Of 
the 72 projects listed, only 18 have active engagement with AI safety. 
We have produced a table/summary of the findings from Fitzgerald et al. 
(2020), “2020 Survey of Artificial General Intelligence Projects for Ethics, 
Risk, and Policy,” a paper commissioned by the Global Catastrophic Risk 
Institute. In this table are: (1) the name of the Project (with link to its 
webpage); (2) the country/leader hosting it; (3) the institution (and type 
of institution) responsible for the project; (4) whether such project has 
ties to the Military sector; (5) whether the project is Open Source; (6) the 
size of the project; and finally (7) the engagement with the AI Security 
area of each project. The table can be found at the link cited in the 
footer.23 
From these results, we can see that, as stated at the beginning of this 
section, AI Safety is still “something new to be integrated.” However, we 
have good examples of organizations that invest and care about the 
ethical and secure development of their applications. Let's take two of the 
largest organizations involved in AI development as an example: 
DeepMind24 and OpenAI.25 
DeepMind is a Google project based in London (UK) led by Demis 
Hassabis and Shane Legg. From their labs, in addition to some of the 
most proficient and general AI models ever produced (Mnhi et al., 2013; 
Silver et al., 2016; Badia et al., 2020), many AI Safety-related studies 
have been produced and published (Leike et al., 2017; Everitt et al., 2019; 
 
23 AI Safety Watch: Advanced Artificial Intelligence R&D (2020). 
https://en.airespucrs.org/post/ai-safety-watch-advanced-artificial-intelligence-r-d-
2020. 
24 https://deepmind.com/.   
25 https://openai.com/.   
Mikulik et al., 2020; Kenton et al., 2021). DeepMind also collaborates 
with OpenAI on projects focused on AI Safety.  
OpenAI, meanwhile, a non-profit AI research organization, is also 
responsible for pushing the state-of-the-art in several areas of the field 
(Brown et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2021), publishing most of its findings 
open-source, and openly promoting its mission to “try to directly build a 
safe and beneficial AGI.” 26 
Let's take as an example two of the most recent models released by 
OpenAI: GPT-3 and Codex. 27 
GPT-3 (Generative Pre-Train Transformer 3), a Transformer with 175 
billion parameters, is a machine learning model trained in an 
unsupervised way (Self-Supervised) capable of generating samples of 
texts such as poems, articles, news, as well as solving several problems 
linked to NLP, without requiring any post-processing or tuning. However, 
what kind of unwanted behavior can we expect from such a model 
interacting with the real world? 
In their publication, Brown et al. (2020) conduct an extensive safety 
analysis of the developed model. In it, the authors report on potential 
malicious applications (e.g., misinformation, spam, cybercrime), issues 
related to equity, bias, and representativeness (e.g., gender, race, 
religion), and even energy consumption related to the use of the model 
(i.e., Sustainability). 
Codex, on the other hand, is a model capable of transcompiling 
commands given in natural language into code (e.g., Python). Codex has 
been trained from GPT language models tuned to open-source public 
 
26 https://openai.com/about/. 
27 These models have not yet (for security reasons) been openly released to the public. 
However, the publications by Brow et al. (2020) and Chen et al. (2021) describe the 
process of training such models. The models can also be accessed via API through the 
OpenAI beta platform, available at: https://beta.openai.com/. 
 
code repositories (GitHub). Let's look at an example generated by the 
OpenAI beta API: 
Command: 
“““ 
1. Create a function that counts prime numbers between 0 and 100. 
2. Plot the number of prime numbers between 0 and 100 as a step 
function. 
3. Label the plot “Number of Primes between 1 and 100.” 





import numpy as np 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
 
def prime_count(n): 
    count = 0 
    for i in range(2, n+1): 
        if sympy.isprime(i): 
            count += 1 
    return count 
 
x = np.arange(0, 100, 1) 
y = np.array([prime_count(i) for i in x]) 
 
plt.step(x, y) 
plt.title(“Number of Primes between 1 and 100”) 
plt.show() 
You can test this result yourself. Just copy and paste the above code into 
a Google Colab notebook and press “play.” The program will produce what 
was requested (and gets the number right, i.e., 25): 
 
Again, we can see in the publication by Chen et al. (2021) an extensive 
analysis of the implications and possible impacts of this type of 
technology, something that promises to make the ability to write and 
generate code extremely accessible to anyone who can read and write 
English language commands (or is literate and has access to a translator). 
In their publication, Chen et al. (2021) mention risk factors such as: 
• Codex does not always produce code that is aligned with the 
programmer's intent. Here, we define misalignment (or “alignment 
failure”) as “when the system is assigned to perform some task X, 
and the system is capable of performing X but 'chooses' not to do 
so” (Chen et al., 2021, p. 11). This contrasts with the situation 
where a system does not do X because it cannot do X, i.e., the 
system is just incompetent; 
• Codex may suggest solutions that superficially appear correct but 
which do not accomplish the task intended by the user (i.e., 
overconfidence); 
• As in the case of other language models, Codex may be asked to 
produce code/comments that contain racist and denigrating 
content; 
 
• The authors evaluated the economic impacts on the labor market 
that automatic code generation models may cause (e.g., reducing 
the value of the work of software engineers and developers); 
• The authors assessed the likelihood that automatic code 
generation models assist in the creation of malware (assisting in 
the realization of cybercrimes); 
• The authors evaluated the environmental impact of training and 
using large models such as Codex-12B (GPT-tuned code generation 
with 12 billion parameters). For example, it is estimated that 
training GPT-3 produced about 552 metric tons of carbon dioxide, 
equivalent to what more than 120 cars produce in a year; 28 
• The authors evaluated how likely it was that the trained model 
would generate code identical to code found in public repositories 
(GitHub). Something that could have unwanted legal implications 
(i.e., violation of private property rights). 
Given all the possible documented risks, the authors further state that: 
[...] given the above, models such as Codex must be 
developed, utilized, and their capabilities carefully 
explored to maximize their positive social impacts and 
minimize the intentional or unintentional harm that 
their use may cause. A contextual approach is 
fundamental to effective risk analysis and mitigation, 
although some categories of mitigations are important 
to consider in any deployment of code generation 
models (Chen et al., 2021, p. 13). 
This is a good example of a product that has been developed under a 
robust ethics and safety regime. Robust in the sense that the problems 
and limitations of the model created are (as far as possible) known to the 
 
28 However, as much as training large models like GPT-3 requires large amounts of 
energy, its inference in, for example, generating 100 pages of content, can cost in the 
order of 0.4 kW/h. 
developers, who have in turn taken the initiative to report them to the 
interested community. 29 
This is one of the roles of the AI safety engineer. Not only to evaluate the 
possible biases and problems that may arise during the training of a 
model and after its implementation in a given context but to seek to 
mitigate new problems that may arise.  
Not all potential uses of a model are always known to its developers. 
Perhaps early machine learning models had clear limits of use (e.g., 
classifying images of digits). However, the same is not true for models 
being generated today. Often models are capable of performing tasks far 
beyond those that their developers had in mind. Again, citing the model 
trained by OpenAI, GPT-3 was only trained to “predict the next word in a 
sequence.” It was expected that the model would be proficient in NLP-
related tasks. What was not expected was that the model would have 
“learned” arithmetic without explicit supervision. 
To avoid being caught off guard, safety analyses must go a bit beyond the 
translational tools we have reviewed. We need quantitative methods to 
evaluate, stress, and attack our models. But how can we implement this 
kind of practice in the development of intelligent systems? In the next 





29 As another example, we can cite Redwood Research, an organization that performs 
applied alignment research in AI. In 2021, the organization was developing techniques 
to control text-generating models (e.g., GPT-3) to prevent such models from producing 
text with unwanted content (the goal of the model being trained by the project was to 




Safety Reports and Model Cards 
 
Given that in certain contexts and applications, the use of AI systems 
must be robustly monitored. One way to connect the concerns and notes 
of developers with those who will use such models and applications 
involves creating documentation that details the performance 
characteristics of a given AI system, i.e., model cards. 
We can define a model card as: 
[...] short documents accompanying models trained by 
machine learning that provide benchmarking under a 
variety of conditions, such as between different cultural, 
demographic, or phenotypic groups (e.g., race, geographic 
location, gender, skin type) and intersectional groups (e.g., 
age, gender) that are relevant to the intended application 
domains. Model cards also reveal the context in which the 
models are intended to be used, details of performance 
evaluation procedures, and other relevant information 
(Mitchell et al., 2019, p. 220). 
We can think of a model letter as the result of a safety assessment of a 
given AI system. As much as there are no standardized and universal 
documentation templates yet, there are suggestions for what such 
templates should look like, and what kind of information should be 
explicit in a model letter (Bender & Friedman, 2018; Holland et al., 2018; 
Gebru et al., 2018).  
A model card intends to provide users of a given system with information 
about:  
• How to use the model; 
• How not to use the model; 
• The kinds of mistakes the model can make most often (i.e., its 
vulnerabilities). 
Informed of this reality, users are expected to be able to use “imperfect 
models” in the best possible way. Model cards can also benefit many 
different types of actors: 
• AI developers can better understand how well a model can work for 
an intended application, compare model results with other similar 
models, understand how a model can be improved, tuned, and 
combined with other models; 
• Software developers who use predictions from AI systems can 
better design their applications;  
• Regulatory entities can understand how an AI system may fail and 
impact people, and use such information to regulate the use of AI 
for certain high-risk applications; 
• People impacted by an AI system can use a model letter to 
determine whether the impacts experienced were properly 
predicted and specified, and at the same time, know who is 
responsible for developing such a model/application. 
We will draw on the work of Mitchell et al. (2019), “Model Cards for Model 
Reporting,” to demonstrate how to use such a tool. In the authors' work, 
Mitchell et al. (2019) used two examples, an image classifier (i.e., a smiley 
detector) trained on the CelebA dataset, and a toxicity detection model 
(e.g., autonomous detection of texts with toxic content). 
Model Card  
Model Details (basic model information) 
1. Organization/Individual who developed the model; 
2. Date of development; 
3. Model version (e.g., v 0.1); 
4. Type of model (e.g., logistic regression model, convolutional neural network, 
transformer language model, vision transformer); 
5. Information about training algorithms, parameters, features used, fairness 
constraints, or other approaches applied; 
6. GitHub article/developer page/repository; 
7. Information for citation; 
8. License; 
 
9. Where to submit questions and comments about the model. 
Intended Use (use cases that were predicted during development) 
1. Primary intended use (What is the intended use of this model?); 
2. Primary intended users (What is the intended target audience of this model?); 
3. Uses outside the intended distribution (What types of applications has the 
model not been trained to support?). 
Factors (e.g., demographic groups, phenotypes, environmental conditions, 
technical assignments, or other relevant factors) 
1. Relevant factors (What are the factors for which model performance may vary, 
and how were these determined?);  
2. Evaluation factors (Which factors are being reported, and why were these 
chosen?). 
Metrics (metrics should be chosen to reflect the potential real-world impacts 
of the model) 
1. Model performance (e.g., accuracy, precision, recall, AUC, etc.); 
2. Decision thresholds (If decision thresholds are used, what are they, and 
decision thresholds, what are they, and why were they chosen?)  
3. Variance approaches (How was model variability measured? Standard 
deviation? Variance?). 
Evaluation data (details of the dataset used for training and evaluating the 
model) 
1. Dataset (Which dataset was used to evaluate the model?); 
2. Motivation (Why was such a data set chosen?); 
3. Preprocessing (How was the data preprocessed? Tokenization? Normalization? 
Were samples with “NaN” values excluded, or were their values estimated?) 
4. Training data (It is not always possible to provide such a set. When possible, 
this section should reflect the evaluation data. If such detail is not possible, 
minimal allowable information should be provided here, such as details of the 
distribution by various factors (e.g., distribution of subgroups across 
characteristics). 
Ethical Considerations (an ethical review need not necessarily produce precise 
solutions, but the ethical contemplation process should be geared towards 
informing stakeholders about concerns raised by developers and steps for 
future work) 
1. Does the model use any sensitive data? 
2. Is the model intended to inform decisions about issues central to human life? 
3. What risk mitigation strategies were used during the development of the 
model? 
4. What risks may be present in the use of the model? 
Details and Recommendations (additional concerns not covered in the previous 
sections) 
1. Do the results suggest any further testing? 
2. Were there any relevant groups that were not represented in the evaluation 
dataset?  
3. Are there any additional recommendations for the use of the model? 
Quantitative Analysis (quantitative analyses should provide the results of the 
model evaluation according to the chosen metrics, broken down by the chosen 
factors) 
1. Unit results (How did the model perform concerning each factor?); 
2. Intersectional results (How did the model perform concerning the intersection 
of the factors evaluated?). 
 
In the above card (Mitchell et al., 2019, p. 222), we see several types of 
information that can shed light on questions about the development, 
intended use, and potential problems of a given model. However, it is 
important to remember that the above list is not exhaustive or complete 
and that such reports should be sensitive to a development/application 
context. 
For example, the amount of information that a private company is willing 
to make public (e.g., training data) may be less than an academic 
organization. Certain companies may choose not to disclose certain key 
information for the development of a commercial application (e.g., 
training algorithms). Even so, there are ways to present pertinent 
information (e.g., the performance of a model) without revealing 
confidential information (e.g., how such a model was developed). 
 
In this work, we will use two different examples:  
• A model for credit card approval, and;  
• A model for forecasting annual income.  
Through these examples, we will suggest some methodologies and tools 
to: (1) inspect a model trained by machine learning; and (2) “fill” a model 
card. However, it is important to remember that (by no means) the tools 
and methodologies presented in these examples are the entirety of AI 
Safety. Nevertheless, they can certainly assist developers in implementing 













Example 1: Credit Card Approval   
 
Evaluation of credit card applications is a task that commercial banks 
commonly use artificial intelligence to automate. In this example, we will 
develop a logistic regression model (one of the most common techniques 
in machine learning) to solve a binary classification problem: classifying 
a credit card application (characterized with a series of features/features) 
as “Approved” or “ Not Approved.” 
We will use the “Credit Approval Dataset” from the UCI Machine Learning 
Repository.30 This dataset has 689 samples of credit card applications, 
labeled as approved or disapproved. However, to protect the privacy of 
the individuals in this dataset, all features have been masked, i.e., 
instead of using explicit feature labels (e.g., Gender = [‘Male, 
‘Female, ‘Non-Binary]), these values were replaced by symbols (e.g., 
Gender = [‘a’, ‘b’, ‘ab’]). 
The features themselves have been removed. However, for this example, 
we will treat each sample as consisting of the following features (typically 
requested in credit card applications): 
• “Gender”, “Age”, “Debt”, “Married”, “Bank Client”, 
“Education”, “Race”, “Years Employed”, “Prior Default”, 
“Employed”, “Credit”, “Driver's License”, 
“Citizenship”, “Postal Code”, “Income”; 
And as a target: 
•  “Approval Status”. 
 
30 UCI Machine Learning Repository, Center for Machine Learning and Intelligent 
Systems. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/credit+approval. 
 
The data can initially be visualized as a Pandas31 data frame: 
 
As has been said, features (especially categorical ones) have been masked 
by “meaningless symbols.” Functions like .info( ) and  describe( ) 
can give us a more detailed overview of the data types we are working 
with. 
We can quickly access how many subgroups each characteristic has (e.g., 
Gender = 3, Education = 15, Race = 10, Prior Default = 2) nd 
other important statistical data (e.g., mean, standard deviation, 
maximum values, minimum values). 
 
 
31 Pandas is a Python library for data analysis. 
t is also important to know what kind of data/characteristics we will be 
working with. In this example we are dealing with numeric values (integer 
numbers, i.e., int64, real numbers, i.e., float64), and categorical values 
(classes, i.e., object). 
 
The dataset used in this example has several missing values (exactly 67) 
that can hurt the performance of our model. A “best practice” in data 
science and machine learning is: (1) remove the samples with missing 
values; or (2) replace the missing values with the mean values (e.g., the 
Since we are working with a small dataset, we will use practice 2. This is 
one of the processes we do during preprocessing, in addition to turning 
all categorical features into numerical features.32 After this phase, we get 
a dataset (with no missing values) ready to be used to train a probabilistic 
classification model. 
 




We can use other tools to explore the data we will be working with. For 
example, the Seaborn data visualization library can be used to explore 
the distribution of the data we will be using to train and evaluate our 
model. 
 
Many of the distributions we have possess “long tails,” i.e., the 
distribution of values/samples follows a Pareto distribution, i.e., the 
volume of samples decreases as the values increase. From this we can 
interpret that, for example, the vast majority of the samples: (i) has not 
worked for many years; (ii) has a low credit score; (iii) has a small (or 
unreported) income. 
In other words, our dataset is not “uniform”. It is extremely biased, being 
a reflection of an unequal environment (e.g., historical biases), and this 
is a red flag. Our model may come to operate less efficiently when dealing 
with samples that have not been “seen enough” in its training (i.e., 
“statistical outliers”). With this in mind, a deeper analysis of the data we 
will be working with is necessary.    
Another tool that we can use to explore the data we are using is the Facets 
library. 
Facets33 s an open-source data visualization tool created by PAIR, 
designed to aid in the understanding and analysis of datasets used in 
machine learning. Facets contains two visualization tools:   
• Facets Overview: Overview provides a quick way to explore the 
distribution of values between characteristics in a data set (e.g., 
common/uncommon values, unexpected/absent values, 
skewness); 
• Facets Dive: Dive provides an interactive interface to explore the 
relationship between different characteristics (e.g. how is the 
distribution of Approval Status versus Gender and Race?) and even 
individual samples.  
Let's see how the distributions analyzed by the Seaborn library are 
presented by Facets Overview: 
 
33 https://Github.com/PAIR-code/facets, https://pair-code.Github.io/facets/. 
 
 
Again, long tails and skewed distributions. It is also curious that 42.67% 
of the samples have “0” income. If almost half of the samples have a null 
value, should we use such a characteristic to train our classifier? Another 
Red Flag. 
 
At the same time, more than half of the samples are of a specific gender 
(“b”). Meanwhile, of the 689 samples, 383 (55.5%) of the credit card 
applications were denied, and 306 (44.5%) applications were approved. 
With this data set, we may be creating a model that: (1) does not perform 
equally (e.g., predictive parity) across genders; and (2) has a higher bias 
for disapproving applications (How might this affect the bank's 
customers?). 
Now, we dive a little deeper into our dataset with Facets Dive. How does 
the characteristic “Race” relate to our target (Approval Status)? 
 
Some subgroups of the characteristic “Race” are strongly 
underrepresented (virtually all when compared to the subgroup “v”). 
Meanwhile, some subgroups have only negative examples (Not-Approved) 
while others have only positive examples (Approved). 
“Prior Default”, i.e., whether the customer has stopped paying bills on 
other credit cards, should be a determining factor for a credit card 
application, as should “Debt”. How do both of these characteristics relate 




Such characteristics are (apparently) the decisive factors in inferring a 
sample's Approval Status, since virtually all samples, as their debt 
increases (0-22), are almost entirely divided between samples that have 
prior defaults (almost all receive a negative Approval Status) and those 
with no prior defaults (mostly positive Approval Status). 
Data visualization techniques can give us valuable insights into the 
dataset we are working on, either by detecting possible flaws our model 
may have, or by deciding which features are best to use in our model. For 
example, if we adopt a “veil of ignorance” view of fairness, we may choose 
not to use any sensitive attributes to train our model (e.g., gender, race), 
since apparently “Prior Default” and “Debt” have a strong correlation with 
Approval Status. 
For simplicity, we will train a generic logistic regression model using 
scikit-learn, an open-source machine learning library. The data has 
already been preprocessed (and (re)scaled to small values, i.e., a real 
number between 0 and 1), and split between a training set (70% of the 
samples) and a test set (30% of the samples). We will not perform 
validation on this example, since it is just an “example”. However, real 
applications need validation steps for tuning the model hyperparameters. 
For this example, we will use all 15 features provided by the dataset, as 
it will be valuable for this study to explore how different features relate to 
each other, and what coefficients are learned by the model for each 
feature. 
Correlation coefficients measure the linear association between 
variables/characteristics. We can interpret these values as follows: 
• 1: Full positive correlation; 
• 0.8: Strong positive correlation; 
• 0.6: Moderate positive correlation; 
• 0: No correlation at all; 
• -0.6: Moderate negative correlation; 
• -0.8: Strong negative correlation; 
• -1: Total negative correlation. 
For example, it is illegal to define the approval status for a credit card 
application based on the race or gender of the applicant. A positive or 
negative value of the correlation coefficient of these characteristics with 
Approval Status would mean unfairness and discrimination by the bank 
that produced this dataset (something that should not be replicated by 
any model). Luckily, correlation coefficients can be easily calculated 
using the NumPy library 34 by the .corrcoef( ) function. 






34 A library that provides a wide variety of mathematical functions (e.g., 
multidimensional matrix operations) by high-level commands. 
 
Bank Client 0.1800 
Education -0.1200 
Race 0.0003 
Years Employed -0.3200 
Prior Default -0.7100 
Employed -0.4500 
Credit -0.4000 
Driver’s License -0.0300 
Citizenship 0.1000 
Postal Code 0.0900 
Income -0.1700 
 
Fortunately, apparently no sensitive attributes, such as race (0.0003) or 
gender (0.03), are correlated with Approval Status significantly! In 
contrast, the characteristic most correlated with Approval Status appears 
to be Prior Default (-0.7100), something that goes in line with our analysis 
done using the Facets Dive tool. Apparently, the determining factors for 
this ranking problem are “Prior Default,” “Debt,” “Employed” and 
“Credit.” If we determine that such attributes are not sensitive, we could 
very well train our classifier with only these characteristics, and still get 
a satisfactory result. 
Let's now look at the final result of our model, i.e., its performance with 
the test portion of the dataset. 
Performance (accuracy): 0.85 
Confusion Matrix Predicted class (Negative) Predicted class (Positive) 
True Class (Negative) 94 6 
True (Positive) Class 26 102 
 
We achieved a performance of 85%. Above we also see the confusion 
matrix from the test we performed of our model. Since we trained our 
model with more examples of “Reprovals” than “Approvals,” we can see 
that our model has a greater tendency to classify people who should be 
approved as not-approved (False Negatives = 11%) than to approve people 
who should be disapproved (False Positives = 0.2%).  
Perhaps, a suggestion to bank managers using this tool is “Failures 
should be better investigated/analyzed, you might be losing a good 
customer.” However, if it is in the bank's interest that False Positives are 
avoided as much as possible, the trained model has a good ratio between 
true positives and false positives (i.e., 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  0.94). 
v We will do just one more analysis in this example. We will look at the 
coefficients learned by our regression model, which basically indicate, as 
do the correlation coefficients, how much “attention” our model gives to 
each of the features in a sample. 
However, before calculating such coefficients, we need to normalize them. 
To do this, we will use functions from the Pandas library, .var( ) and 
.std( ), to calculate the variance and standard deviation of our feature 
values. 35 
Standard deviation and variance can help us understand other important 
relationships in our data set. And with standard deviation, we can 
normalize the coefficients in our model and interpret them correctly (i.e., 
normalized values are values that “share” a fictitious common scale). 
 
35 Remember that the variance and standard deviation were calculated with the 
rescaled/normalized values (delimited between 0 and 1) because it would be 
meaningless to compare the variance and standard deviation of values measured by 
different scales (e.g., years versus dollars?). 
 
 
Again, the main factor for predicting “Approval Status” is “Prior Default”. 
Notice that “Race”, with a coefficient of -0.002, is not even visible in the 
plot above. Armed with all this information, let's now fill in our model 
card. 
Model Card - Credit Card Approval 
Model Details 
1. Model developed by Nicholas Kluge, researcher at the Pontifical Catholic 
University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), in October 2021;  
2. This is a Logistic Regression model for binary classification, version 0.1. This 
model was trained to classify credit card applications as “Not-Approved” or 
“Approved”;  
3. This model was trained only for academic motivations, and it does not follow any 
kind of fairness/justice constraints. This model is not designed to be implemented 
in real applications; 
4. The dataset used is the Credit Approval Dataset from the UCI Machine Learning 
Repository. Available at: 
http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/credit+approval;  
5. The code for this model can be found in: https://Github.com/Nkluge-correa/AI-
Ethics-exercise;  
6. License: MIT License; 
7. Contact: nicholas.correa@acad.pucrs.br.  
Intended Use  
1. The intended use of this model, and the shared code, is to present the developer 
with tools to explore a dataset and assess possible ethical implications and 
security flaws of a model trained by machine learning. This model and code are 
not meant to be used in real applications. However, the tools used can be used 
for ethical evaluations of models trained by machine learning; 
2. This model is designed for the academic audience, developers, and machine 
learning practitioners interested in learning how to develop “fair” models; 
3. As an academic experiment, the only use for this model is to rank credit card 
applications from samples taken from the Credit Approval Dataset This model 
should not be used for, e.g., credit score classification, credit score inference, or 
any other type of task other than its primary intended use. 
Factors 
1. The characteristics used for the task of rating the Approval Status of a credit card 
applicant are: “Gender”, “Age”, “Debt”, “Married”, “Bank Client”, “Education”, 
“Race”, “Years of Employment”, “ Prior Default”, “Employed”, “Credit”, “Driver's 
License”, “ Citizenship”, “ Postal Code”, “Income”. Attributes like “Gender” and 
“Race” are considered sensitive attributes; 
2. The data used for training does not have an even distribution among the 
subgroups for each trait. There is a strong bias, for certain types of subgroups, 
such as genders and specific races. 
Metrics 
1. The performance metric used was accuracy (total no. of correct classifications per 
total classifications performed), 85% correct during the test run; 
2. The model has a greater tendency to classify people who should pass as failures 
(False Negatives = 11%) than to approve people who should fail (False Positives = 
0.2%);  
3. Suggestion: failures should be better investigated/analyzed;  
 
4. Training and testing data were split from the dataset provided by the UCI Machine 
Learning Repository (i.e., Credit Approval Dataset); 
5. This dataset was chosen for its public availability. 
6. Samples with missing values (i.e., “?” or “NaN”) had such values replaced with the 
average value of their specific feature. 
Ethical Considerations 
1. Given the skewed distribution of the training data, the model may behave 
inefficiently when dealing with poorly seen samples; 
2. The model uses sensitive data (i.e., Race and Gender); 
3. It's recommended that for real applications, sensitive attributes (e.g., race and 
gender) and attributes containing “abnormal” values (e.g., income) not be used 
for classification; 
4. According to correlation coefficients, and coefficients learned by the model, 
sensitive attributes do not interfere with model classification; 
5. The attributes most correlated with the applicant's Approval Status are: “Prior 
Default,” “Debt,” “Employee,” and “Credit.” 
Details and Recommendations 
1. An analysis of the model's performance across different subgroups of each 
characteristic was not performed. Further analysis may reveal that the model 
violates fairness criteria, such as predictive parity; 
2. The data used for this example do not reflect the social and historical context of 
a place such as Brazil. They reflect the North American social and historical 
context. Thus, it is not recommended to use it for application development outside 







Example 2: Annual Income Forecast   
 
Something we did not do in our last analysis (Example 1) was to 
evaluate/compare the performance of the trained model between different 
subgroups: 
• Gender: how does the model performance differ between men and 
women? 
In this example, we will do exactly this. 
We will use the “Adult Census Income Dataset” 36 also provided by the 
UCI Machine Learning Repository. This dataset is a machine learning 
“classic” extracted from the US Census Bureau in 1994 by Ronny Kohavi 
and Barry Becker. The task we will tackle will also be a binary prediction 
task: determining whether a person earns more than USD 50,000 per year. 
We will be using virtually all the libraries we used in Example 1 (i.e., 
Numpy, Pandas, Matplotlib, Seaborn, Facets), with the addition of two 
new libraries: Tensorflow37 and Keras.38 The features contained in this 
dataset are: 
• “age,” “work-class,” “fnlwgt” (the number of individuals the 
Census Bureau believes the set of observations represents, i.e., the 
weight of observations), “education,” “education_num” (an 
enumeration of the categorical representation of education), 
“marital_status,” “occupation,” “relationship,” 
 
36 Lichman, M. (2013). UCI Machine Learning Repository. 
http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Census+Income. 
37 An open-source library for machine learning. https://www.tensorflow.org/. 
38 An open-source library, created by François Chollet, for neural network development. 
https://keras.io/. 
“race,” “gender,” “capital_gain,” “capital_loss,” 
“hours_per_week” (hours worked per week), 
“native_country” (nationality), “income_bracket” (annual 
income). 
We have 14 characteristics and 1 target (i.e., annual income).  
 
With this dataset we have an advantage over the dataset used in the 
previous example: we have more than 32,000 samples to use. So this 
time, we will not replace uncommon/absent values (e.g., 'NaN,' '?') with 
their respective mean values, but we will exclude all samples that have 
absent values. This leaves exactly 30,163 samples for training (45,224 if 
we count the samples from the test set). And again, during preprocessing, 





Before that, let's inspect our dataset directly with Facets, which is (by far) 
the best data analysis and visualization tool we presented in the previous 
example. Some questions that can guide our investigation are: 




Definitely yes. For capital gain/loss/investments, we can see that over 
90% of the values are 0. In a world where income distribution is extremely 
unequal, it should not be a surprise that less than 10% have values other 
than 0. The vast majority of the population does not invest, gain or lose 
capital (because they simply do not own it). 
However, it is not at all obvious how to interpret such a result. After all, 
does “0” mean no gain/loss or unreported gain/loss? Both situations are 
quite different. In situations like this, it is better not to use such a feature 
for training our model. 
• Are there signs of bias in the data set? 
 
Yes. 67% of the examples represent men. This suggests considerable bias 
in the data, as we would expect the gender breakdown to be closer to 1:1. 
In addition to the underrepresentation of the female gender, we see a 
large racial underrepresentation. 
This bias may hurt the performance of our model for a subgroup in which 
there are few samples/examples.  
 
 
Using Facets Dive, we can look for ways in which characteristics are 
correlated with each other. Annual income and education level seem to 
be well correlated, since for the highest levels of education (e.g., Ph.D. 
and post-doctoral), we see the only class where most samples receive > 
USD 50,000.  
Meanwhile, if we explore Occupation × Gender, we will see that we rarely 
find women working in the agricultural livestock sector (Could this be a 
faithful representation of the real world?), while women dominate 
occupations involving administrative and clerical positions.  
There are many other correlations to be investigated, one last one we will 
show is the intersection of samples between Race × Marital Status × 
Income. 
  
In a nutshell, if you want to find samples with an annual income of more 
than USD 50,000, look for married Caucasian people.  
For this example, we will only use the following features to train our 
model: 
• “workclass,” “race,” “education,” “marital_status,” 
“age,” “relationship,” “native_country,” “occupation.” 
And we will use the libraries Keras and TensorFlow to create and train a 
“densely connected feed-forward neural network” with three hidden 
layers (the tuning parameters of the developed model can be seen in the 
notebook for this example). We will use 30,163 samples for training and 
 
15,061 samples to test the model (again, since this is just an example, 
we will skip the validation phase). 
In this example, we will use more than one metric to evaluate the 
performance of our model: accuracy,39 precision,40 recall,41 and AUC.42 
Overall, our model achieves the following performance values:  
 Accuracy Precision Recall AUC 
Performance 0.8325 0.7074 0.5577 0.8832 
 
Accuracy is the same performance metric that we used in the first 
example. This is the most “straightforward” and commonly used metric, 
“how many times did the classifier get it right?”. However, accuracy is not 
always the metric that we should adopt to evaluate a given application. 
Precision is generally used as a performance metric for applications 
where a false positive is a worse problem than a false negative. For 
example, in spam detection a false positive means blocking a potentially 
important email. While receiving spam is “tolerable,” missing the 
 
39 The fraction of predictions that a classification model gets right. In binary 
classification, accuracy has the following definition: 
𝑎𝑐𝑐 =  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
40 Precision: 
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
41 Recall: 
𝑟𝑒𝑐 =  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
 
42 AUC (Area under the ROC Curve, i.e., a curve of the true positive rate versus the false 
positive rate at different classification thresholds) is the probability that a classifier is 
more confident that a randomly chosen positive sample is actually positive than a 
randomly chosen negative sample is positive. 
expected response from that prestigious academic journal is 
unacceptable. 
Recall is the opposite of Precision. Recall measures false negatives 
against true positives, and in applications such as disease detection, 
where false negatives must be avoided at all costs, recall is the 
performance to watch out for. 
Whereas AUC, which in the case of our model is a metric with the closest 
value to accuracy, is the probability that, say, our classifier will yell 
“Wolf!” when there really is a wolf around. That is, to classify a randomly 
selected sample as its true class.  
Which metrics should we use to evaluate our model? It depends on the 
application of this model. Let's say the model will be used to evaluate who 
(by having an annual income > USD 50,000) should pay more taxes. For 
that application, a false positive (the individual is classified as receiving 
> USD 50,000 but actually receives < USD 50,000) seems to be more 
damaging than a false negative. In other words, for this application, 
precision seems to be the appropriate performance metric (luckily, the 
precision of our model is higher than its recall). 
While evaluating the overall performance of the model gives us some 
insight into its quality, it does not give us much insight into the 
performance of our model for different subgroups. Evaluating a deep 
neural network is different from evaluating a simple logistic regression 
model since we cannot inspect the coefficients of this model in an 
intelligible and simple way (our neural network has more than 35,000 
trained parameters). 
In this example, we will define that gender, race, and marital status are 
sensitive attributes. And we will explore some of the differences in 
 
performance between subgroups of these characteristics. If we are going 
to compare the confusion matrix of the subgroup “Male” vs “Female”: 
We will see that in terms of accuracy and AUC, women receive a better 
rating (accuracy having an almost equal value for both genders). 
However, since we know that women are disproportionately represented 
in this dataset, this is a possible sign of overfitting. There is also a 
considerable discrepancy in the performance of this model between 
subgroups of the characteristics race, gender, and marital status. 
However, a positive point is that we have, overall, a high precision value 
in combination with a low recall value. One way to interpret this result is 
that our classifier is extremely “picky,” in the sense that all people 
classified as “Annual income > USD 50,000” actually have this income. 
However, the model fails to positively classify several people with income 
> USD 50,000 because our model is “extremely picky.” 
If we use this model to define who should pay more (or less) taxes when 
the model classifies someone as “Annual income > USD 50,000”, the 
model will almost always get it right (the model is accurate). However, 
many people who also have an income > USD 50,000 will not be “caught” 
by this classifier.   
The summary of the performance of the trained model, across subgroups 
of the given sensitive attributes, is as follows: 
Performance by Gender 
 Accuracy Precision Recall AUC 
Male 0.7888 0.7492 0.4917 0.8592 
Female 0.9145 0.7363 0.3867 0.9120 
Performance by Race 
 Accuracy Precision Recall AUC 
Caucasian 0.8227 0.7527 0.4882 0.8812 
Black 0.8896 0.7068 0.2568 0.9102 
Asian-American 0.7966 0.6774 0.5081 0.8592 
Eskimo 0.8951 0.6429 0.2647 0.7831 
 
Others 0.9134 0.5385 0.3333 0.9209 
Performance by Marital Status 
 Accuracy Precision Recall AUC 
Married 
(civil spouse) 
0.7120 0.7475 0.5541 0.7900 
Divorced 0.8949 0.7143 0.0332 0.7959 
Married 
(spouse absent) 
0.9189 0.6667 0.0645 0.8214 
Never Married 0.9524 1.0000 0.0149 0.8859 
Separated 0.9329 0.8000 0.0606 0.8442 
Married 
(military spouse) 
0.5238 0.0000 0.0000 0.6955 
Widow 0.9033 0.5000 0.0125 0.7569 
 
We cannot attest to statistical parity, predictive parity, or equalized odds 
for this model. The results show that such a model does not meet these 
fairness criteria, since, for example, certain subgroups are more 
susceptible to certain prediction errors than others (especially individuals 
who belong to certain marital status subgroups, e.g., Married (military 
spouse). 
Such results suggest that we have a model that is overfitted, very much 
in part by the underrepresentation of several subgroups. Thus, we cannot 
guarantee that such a model will generalize well, as we do not have 
enough examples of all subgroups for such a model to “learn.”  
With all these results in hand, we can now fill out our model card: 
 
Model Card - Annual Income Forecast 
Model Details 
1. A model developed by Nicholas Kluge, a researcher at the Pontifical Catholic 
University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), in October 2021;  
2. This is a direct (dense) deep neural network, trained to solve a binary 
classification task, version 0.1. This model was trained to classify individuals 
between “Annual income > USD 50,000 “ or “Annual income < USD 50,000 “;  
3. This model was trained for academic motivations only, and it does not follow any 
kind of fairness/justice constraints. It is not designed to be implemented in real 
applications; 
4. The dataset used is the Adult Census Income Dataset, made available by the UCI 
Machine Learning Repository. Available at: 
http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Census+Income;   
5. The code for this model can be found in: https://Github.com/Nkluge-correa/AI-
Ethics-Exercice-2; 
6. License: MIT License;   
7. Contact: nicholas.correa@acad.pucrs.br.  
Intended Use 
1. The intended use of this model, and the shared code, is to present the developer 
with some tools to explore a dataset and evaluate possible ethical implications and 
security flaws of a model trained by machine learning. This model and code are 
not meant to be used in real applications. However, the tools used can be used for 
ethical evaluations of models trained by machine learning; 
2. This model was developed for the academic audience, developers, and machine 
learning practitioners interested in learning how to develop “fair” models; 
3. As an academic experiment, the only use for this model is to predict Annual Income 
from samples taken from the Adult Census Income Dataset. This model should not 
be used for, e.g., lifetime income prediction, or any other type of task other than 
its primary intended use. 
Factors 
1. The characteristics used to train the model are: “work-class,” “race,” “education,” 
“marital_status,” “age,” “relationship,” “native_country,” “occupation.” Attributes 
such as “Gender,” “Race,” and “Marital Status” were considered as sensitive 
attributes;   
2. The data used for training does not have a uniform distribution among the 
subgroups for each characteristic. There is a strong bias, for certain types of 
subgroups, such as gender, marital status, and specific races. 
 
Metrics 
1. The performance metrics used were accuracy (83%), precision (70%), recall (55%), 
and AUC (88%); 
2. The model has good accuracy when classifying people who have annual income > 
USD 50,000 (70%). However, most of the misclassifications made by this model 
are False Negatives (individuals with annual income > USD 50,000, who are 
classified as having annual income < USD 50,000;  
3. Warning: Model performance varies considerably across subgroups of sensitive 
attributes (e.g., gender, race, marital status);  
4. Training and testing data were acquired directly from the dataset provided by the 
UCI Machine Learning Repository (i.e., Adult Census Income Dataset); 
5. This dataset was chosen for its public availability; 
6. Samples with missing values (i.e., “?” or “NaN”) were excluded from the dataset. 
Ethical Considerations 
1. Given the skewed distribution of the training data, the model may behave 
inefficiently when dealing with poorly viewed samples. Its performance varies 
considerably between subgroups, failing to reach minimum standards of predictive 
power for certain subgroups (e.g., Married-military-spouse); 
2. It is recommended that for real applications, the dataset be augmented so that 
there is a better distribution of samples by subgroups of features; 
3. According to the performance results and confusion matrices between subgroups, 
sensitive attributes may interfere with the prediction of this model. 
Details and Recommendations 
1. The trained model results in a performance that varies across subgroups belonging 
to sensitive characteristics/attributes. If used for applications that may impact 
people's lives (e.g., determining who should pay higher taxes), the model may harm 
underrepresented populations in the Adult Census Income Dataset; 
2. The data used for this example does not reflect the social and historical context of 
a place such as Brazil. They reflect the North American social and historical 
context. Thus, it is not recommended to use it for application development outside 
this specific domain. 
Quantitative Analysis 
 
Performance by Gender 
 Accuracy Precision Recall AUC 
Male 0.7888 0.7492 0.4917 0.8592 
Female 0.9145 0.7363 0.3867 0.9120 
Performance by Race 
 Accuracy Precision Recall AUC 
Caucasian 0.8227 0.7527 0.4882 0.8812 
Black 0.8896 0.7068 0.2568 0.9102 
Asian-American 0.7966 0.6774 0.5081 0.8592 
Eskimo 0.8951 0.6429 0.2647 0.7831 
Others 0.9134 0.5385 0.3333 0.9209 
Performance by Marital Status 
 Accuracy Precision Recall AUC 
Married 
(civil spouse) 
0.7120 0.7475 0.5541 0.7900 
Divorced 0.8949 0.7143 0.0332 0.7959 
Married 
(spouse absent) 
0.9189 0.6667 0.0645 0.8214 
Never Married 0.9524 1.0000 0.0149 0.8859 
Separated 0.9329 0.8000 0.0606 0.8442 
Married 
(military spouse) 
0.5238 0.0000 0.0000 0.6955 
Widow 




We hope that the examples (as well as the tools) presented in this paper 
can help developers design and improve their own security analyses, thus 
 
instituting AI Ethics and Security as an integral part of the intelligent 
systems development process. In the next section, we will present one 















Adversarial Attacks  
 
Models created by machine learning are curious systems. As much as 
such systems are capable of performing extremely complex tasks for 
which we would not know how to “write a solution,” their operation and 
the way such systems “perceive” the environment (i.e., their inputs) allow 
them to be fooled by what we call “adversarial attacks. 
 Adversarial attacks, or examples, are inputs/inputs to machine learning 
models created with the express intent of causing a model to make a 
mistake (e.g., a misclassification) (Szegedy et al., 2013). These attacks 
use the fact that machine learning models are (basically) sets of activation 
functions and parameters optimized by gradient descent. If we have direct 
(or indirect) access to the parameter values of a model (or the model 
gradient itself), we can use such information to corrupt input signals by 
adding almost imperceptible perturbations to make the model produce 
the output we want. 
 
 
In the example above, Goodfellow et al. (2014) used knowledge of the 
model's gradient to create an example that (to us) is clearly a panda, but 
to the model, is a Gibbon with 99.3% confidence. In other words, the 
authors evaluated how close the “Panda” class is to the “Gibbon” class 
An adversarial example, created by adding a small perturbation (𝜖) to the image of 
a “Panda” to make a CNN classify it as a “Gibbon” (Goodfellow et al., 2014, p. 3). 
 
 
within the model's space of representations and “pushed” (i.e., perturbed) 
such an image to cause the representations/parameters associated with 
classifying the “Gibbon” class to be strongly (99.3%) activated, causing a 
misclassification. 
With adversarial examples, attackers can exploit potential flaws in 
models trained by machine learning, something that makes such entities 
worthy of attention and monitoring. For example, Papernot et al. (2016a) 
demonstrated how images of traffic signs (e.g., STOP) can be altered to 
produce misclassifications (e.g., GO), something that could eventually 
cause traffic accidents involving autonomous cars guided by computer 
vision. Ahmad et al. (2021) suggest that facial recognition systems used 
to delimit access to restricted areas could be tricked into allowing 
unauthorized people to enter (e.g., the attacker can discover a kind of 
facial makeup/painting that produces a recognition signal with high 
confidence). 
Using the model for credit card approval as an example (Example 1), a 
simple way to (i) understand how the model works, and (ii) exploit it, is 
by spoofing signals (i.e., creating adversarial examples). The inputs to the 
model used in Example 1 are just Rank-1 tensors (i.e., vectors with 15 
feature values). So, we can create two Rank-1 tensors (with the 
appropriate dimension) to test how the model responds. Let's use two 
extreme examples, i.e., where all values are either 0 or 1: 
● Extreme_case_1 = np.array([[0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]]); 
● Extreme_case_2 = np.array([[1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 
1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1.]]). 
The “normal” signals/samples have much more varied values (e.g., 
sample[10] = ([[0.0, 0.84393064, 0.02982143, 0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 
0.88888889, 0.01754386, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.49112426, 
0.00228963]])). How does the model created respond to this type of 
input? 
 Approved Not Approved 
Extreme_case_1 0.20780003 0.79219997 
Extreme_case_2 0.99278847 0.00721153 
 
We now know that samples containing multiple zeros will generate 
failures (with 79% confidence) and that samples containing multiple ones 
will generate approvals (with 99% confidence). All we would now need to 
do is to (subtly) modify the input values to create numerous sample 
instances that will be classified in any way we wish. 
In the battle between attackers and defenders, the defenders are at a 
disadvantage. Adversarial examples are not necessarily invalid solutions 
but rather “unexpected solutions” to a complex optimization problem. We 
use machine learning to find solutions to problems that we do not know 
how to solve straightforwardly. Since many of the processes that guide 
the optimization of nonlinear/non-convex problems are not yet fully 
understood (How can random initialization of a neural network's 
parameters influence its final performance?) (Frankle & Carbin, 2019), 
we have no theorems or formal guarantees that allow us to 
detect/exclude/protect a model against adversarial examples. 
Thus, defenders don't have the tools to protect a model against all 
possible types of attacks because we don't know how to find them 
systematically and completely. Meanwhile, attackers only need to find “a 
flaw.” A perturbation that brings them closer to the desired result. And 
like that, bend the model to their will. Designing defenses against 
adversarial attacks remains an open problem in AI Safety. 
The study of adversarial examples is exciting because 
many of the most important problems remain open, both 
theoretically and in terms of applications. On the 
 
theoretical side, no one yet knows whether defense against 
adversarial examples is a theoretically hopeless endeavor 
(like trying to find a universal machine learning algorithm) 
or whether an optimal strategy would give the defender 
some advantage (as in cryptography and differential 
privacy). On the applied side, no one has yet designed a 
truly powerful defense algorithm that could withstand a 
wide variety of adversarial example attack algorithms 
(Goodfellow & Papernot, 2017).  
There are several benchmarks for model robustness evaluation, by which 
we can perform stress tests and find situations where our models have 
failed (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019; Hendrycks et al., 2021b; Koh et al., 
2021). Thus, something a machine learning safety engineer can do is to 
become the first “attacker” of his own model. In other words, managing 
adversarial attacks should be one of the essential steps of developing and 
monitoring a model before and after its deployment. 
Much of the current research in adversarial attacks focus on the problem 
of “𝑙𝑝 adversarial robustness”, i.e., situations where attackers seek to 
induce a model to error but limit the perturbations introduced to the 
sample within a small constraint (“small perturbations”) (Carlini & 
Wagner, 2017). Attacks can be built on internal model information (e.g., 
its gradient/parameter values, as was done in the “Panda/Gibbon” 
example), or just by observing the model's input/output relationship 
(e.g., as was demonstrated in the credit card approval example) (Tramèr 
et al., 2018). 
There are several strategies for developing adversarial examples, such as 
brute force search (i.e., massive generation of examples to find 
adversarial samples), artificial data generation/data augmentation 
(Engstrom et al., 2020; Zhu et al, 2021; Rebuffi et al., 2021), and learning 
techniques that benefit the detection of samples outside the training 
distribution and anomalous samples/outliers that are difficult to classify 
(e.g., self-supervised learning) (Hendrycks et al., 2019). 
For those interested in learning more about techniques for building 
adversarial examples, CleverHans43 is a software library that provides 
standardized reference implementations to help developers create models 
that are more robust to adversarial samples. Using CleverHans, 
developers can create their own adversarial datasets in a standardized 
way and train their models to handle such samples robustly. Developers 
can even create their own evaluation/training benchmarks against 
adversarial samples (Papernot et al., 2016b). 
Ian Goodfellow and Nicolas Papernot (creators of the CleverHans library) 
maintain a blog 44 about safety and privacy in machine learning. There 
you can find commented examples, along with open-source scripts, 




















Importantly, to date, there is little evidence that the use of any of the 
tools/methods mentioned in this work are effective in optimizing the 
ethical design of algorithmic systems. As such, it is still necessary for 
studies aimed at implementing these techniques to demonstrate the 
results of their methodologies, either by assisting disadvantaged social 
groups or avoiding possible side effects of poorly designed AI systems. 
The main goal of this guide is to provide developers of AI systems with 
tools and methods to apply during the life cycle of these types of systems. 
It is only through experimentation that we will know which tools work, 
which work better, and which should be improved. 
We hope that we have helped all those interested in bridging the gap 
between theory and practice of safe and ethical AI development to 










Agüera y Arcas, B., Todorov, A., & Mitchell, M. (2018). Do algorithms reveal 
sexual orientation or just expose our stereotypes? Medium. 
https://link.medium.com/GO7FJgFgM1. 
Ahmad, Z., Khan, A. S., Shiang, C. W., Abdullah, J., & Ahmad, F. (2021). 
Network intrusion detection system: A systematic study of machine learning 
and deep learning approaches. Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications 
Technologies, 32(1), e4150. doi: 10.1002/ett.4150. 
AI Robotics Ethics Society (AIRES) at PUCRS. (2021). An Open Letter to the 
Global South: Bring the “rest” in. AI Robotics Ethics Society. 
AlgorithmWatch. (2020). AI Ethics Guidelines Global Inventory. Algorithm 
Watch. https://inventory.algorithmwatch.org/. 
Amodei, D., Olah, C., Steinhardt, J., Christiano, P., Schulman, J., & Mané, D. 
(2016). Concrete problems in AI safety. ArXiv. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.06565. 
Ananny, M., & Crawford, K. (2018). Seeing without knowing: Limitations of the 
transparency ideal and its application to algorithmic accountability. New Media 
& Society, 20(3), 973–989. doi:10.1177/1461444816676645. 
Badia, A., Bilal, P., Kapturowski, S., Sprechmann, P., Vitvitskyi, A., Guo, D., & 
Blundell, C. (2020). Agent57: Outperforming the Atari Human Benchmark. 
DeepMind. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.13350.pdf. 
Balch, O. (2020). AI and me: friendship chatbots are on the rise, but is there a 
gendered design flaw? The Guardian.  
https://www.theguardian.com/careers/2020/may/07/ai-and-me-friendship-
chatbots-are-on-the-rise-but-is-there-a-gendered-design-flaw. 
Baum, S. (2017). A Survey of Artificial General Intelligence Projects for Ethics, 
Risk, and Policy. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Working Paper, 1-17. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070741. 
Bender, E. M., & Friedman, B. (2018). Data Statements for NLP: Toward 
Mitigating System Bias and Enabling Better Science. Transactions of the 
Association for Computational Linguistics, 6, 587-604. doi: 
10.1162/tacl_a_00041.  
Boddington, P. (2017). Towards a code of ethics for artificial intelligence. Springer 
International Publishing. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-60648-4. 
 
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2013). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the 
Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States (4th edition). Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Brown, T., Mann, B., Ryder, N., et al. (2020). Language Models are Few-Shot 
Learners. ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.14165.pdf. 
Calo, R. (2017). Artifcial intelligence policy: a primer and roadmap. SSRN 
Journal, 399–435. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3015350. 
Calvo R. A., Peters D., Vold K., & Ryan R. M. (2020) Supporting Human Autonomy 
in AI Systems: A Framework for Ethical Enquiry. In Ethics of Digital Well-Being, 
Philosophical Studies Series, vol 140, Burr C., & Floridi L. (eds.). Springer, 
Cham. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-50585-1_2. 
Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2017). Towards evaluating the robustness of neural 
networks. In the 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.04644. 
Carrillo, R. M. (2020). Artificial intelligence: From ethics to law. 
Telecommunications Policy, 44(6), 101937. doi: 10.1016/j.telpol.2020.101937. 
Chen, M., Tworek, J., Jun, H., Yuan, Q., Pinto, H., Kaplan, J., Edwards, H., 
Burda, Y., Joseph, N. et al. (2021). Evaluating Large Language Models Trained 
on Code. OpenAI. https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.03374. 
Chouldechova, A. (2016). Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias 
in Recidivism Prediction Instruments. Big Data, 5(2), 153-163. 
doi:10.1089/big.2016.0047. 
Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. (1992). The computational brain. USA, 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Collins, E. (2018). Punishing Risk. Geo. L. J, 57. 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171053 
Corbett-Davies, S., Pierson, E., Feller, A., Goel, S., & Huq, A. (2017). Algorithmic 
Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness. In the Proceedings of the 23rd ACM 
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 
797–806. doi:10.1145/3097983.3098095. 
Corrêa, N. K., & De Oliveira, N. (2021). Good AI for the Present of Humanity 
Democratizing AI Governance. AI Ethics Journal, 2(2)-2. doi: 
10.47289/AIEJ20210716-2. 
Critch, A., & Krueger, D. (2020). AI Research Considerations for Human 
Existential Safety (ARCHES). ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.04948. 
Dwork, C., Hardt, M., Pitassi, T., Reingold, O., & Zeme, R. (2012). Fairness 
Through Awareness. In Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical 
Computer Science Conference, 214–226. doi: 10.1145/2090236.2090255. 
Ekstrand, M.D., Joshaghani, R., & Mehrpouyan, H. (2018). Privacy for all: 
Ensuring fair and equitable privacy protections. Proceedings of the 1st 
Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, 1–13. 
Engstrom, L., Ilyas, A., Santurkar, S., Tsipras, D., Steinhardt, J., & Madry, A. 
(2020). Identifying Statistical Bias in Dataset Replication. In 2020 International 
Conference on Machine Learning. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.09619. 
Everitt, T., Kumar, R., Krakovna, V., Legg, S. (2019). Modeling AGI Safety 
Frameworks with Causal Influence Diagrams. DeepMind.  
https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.08663. 
Fazelpour, S., & Lipton, Z. C. (2020). Algorithmic fairness from a non-ideal 
perspective. In the Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and 
Society, 57–63. doi: 10.1145/3375627.3375828. 
Fitzgerald, M., Boddy, A., & Baum, S. B. (2020). 2020 Survey of Artificial 
General Intelligence Projects for Ethics, Risk, and Policy. Global Catastrophic 
Risk Institute Technical Report 20-1.  
Fjeld, J., Achten, N., Hilligoss, H., Nagy, A., & Srikumar, M. (2020). Principled 
Artificial Intelligence. Mapping Consensus in Ethical and Rights-Based 
Approaches to Principles for Ai. In Berkman Klein Center Research Publication 
2020, p. 1–39. 
Floridi, L., & Taddeo, M. (2016). What is data ethics? Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 
374(2083), 20160360. doi: 10.1098/rsta.2016.0360. 
Floridi, L., Cowls, J., Beltrametti, M., et al. (2018). AI4People—An Ethical 
Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and 
Recommendations. Minds & Machines, 28, 689–707. doi:10.1007/s11023-018-
9482-5. 
Frankle, J., & Carbin, M. (2019). The Lottery Ticket Hypothesis: Finding Sparse, 
Trainable Neural Networks. In the International Conference on Learning 
Representations (2019). https://openreview.net/pdf?id=rJl-b3RcF7. 
Fryer, R., Loury, G., & Yuret, T. (2008). An Economic Analysis of Color-Blind 
Affirmative Action. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24(2), 319–
355. 
Gajane, P., & Pechenizkiy, M. (2018). On Formalizing Fairness in Prediction with 
Machine Learning. Department of Computer Science, Montanuniversitat 
Leoben, Austria, and the Department of Computer Science, TU Eindhoven, the 
Netherlands. ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.03184. 
 
Galhotra, S., Brun, Y., & Meliou, A. (2017). Fairness Testing: Testing Software 
for Discrimination. In the Proceedings of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting on 
Foundations of Software Engineering, 498–510. doi:10.1145/3106237.3106277. 
Gebru, T., Morgenstern, J., Vecchione, B., Vaughan, J. W., Wallach, H., Daumé 
III, H., & Crawford, K. (2018). Datasheets for Datasets. ArXiv. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010. 
Goldsmith, J., & Burton, E. (2017). Why teaching ethics to AI practitioners is 




Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., Szegedy, C. (2014). Explaining and Harnessing 
Adversarial Examples. In the 2015 International Conference on Learning 
Representations. https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572. 
Goodfellow, I., & Papernot, N. (2017). Is attacking machine learning easier than 
defending it? Cleverhans-blog. 
www.cleverhans.io/security/privacy/ml/2017/02/15/why-attacking-
machine-learning-is-easier-than-defending-it.html. 
Green, B. (2019). “Good” isn’t good enough. In NeurIPS workshop on AI for social 
good.  https://www.benzevgreen.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/19-
ai4sg.pdf. 
Greene, J., Rossi, F., Tasioulas, J., Venable, K. B., & Williams, B. (2016). 
Embedding Ethical Principles in Collective Decision Support Systems. In 
Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-16).  
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI16/paper/view/12457. 
Guidotti, R., Monreale, A., Ruggieri, S., Turini, F., Giannotti, F., & Pedreschi, D. 
(2018). A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black Box Models. ACM Comput. 
Surv. CSUR, 51(5), 93:1–93:42. doi: 10.1145/3236009. 
Hagendorff, T. (2020). The Ethics of AI Ethics: An Evaluation of Guidelines. 
Minds and Machines, 30, 99–120. doi:10.1007/s11023-020-09526-7. 
Hardt, M., Price, E., & Srebro, N. (2016). Equality of opportunity in supervised 
learning. In the Proceedings of the 2016 Advances in neural information 
processing systems, 29, 3315–3323. 
Hendrycks, D., & Dietterich, T. (2019). Benchmarking Neural Network 
Robustness to Common Corruptions and Perturbations. In the 2019 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Learning Representations. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.12261. 
Hendrycks, D., Mazeika, M., Kadavath, S., & Song, D. (2019). Using Self-
Supervised Learning Can Improve Model Robustness and Uncertainty. In the 
2019 Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.12340. 
Hendrycks, D., Carlini, N., Schulman, J., Steinhardt, J. (2021a). Unsolved 
Problems in ML Safety. ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.13916#. 
Hendrycks, D., Basart, S., Mu, N., Kadavath, S., Wang, F., Dorundo, E., Desai, 
R., Zhu, T., Parajuli, S., Guo, M., Song, D., Steinhardt, J., & Gilmer, J. (2021b). 
The Many Faces of Robustness: A Critical Analysis of Out-of-Distribution 
Generalization. In the 2021 International Conference on Computer Vision. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.16241. 
Hirose, I. (2014). Egalitarianism (1st edition). UK, London: Routledge. 
Hofstede, G. H., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and 
Organizations: Software of the Mind (3rd edition). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Holland, S., Hosny, A., Newman, S., Joseph, J., & Chmielinski, K. (2018). The 
Dataset Nutrition Label: A Framework To Drive Higher Data Quality Standards. 
ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.03677#. 
Hubinger, E., van Merwijk, C., Mikulik, V., Skalse, J., & Garrabrant, S. (2019). 
Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems. 
Machine Intelligence Research Institute. https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.01820. 
Hutter, M. (2005). Universal artificial intelligence: Sequential decisions based 
on algorithmic probability. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. 
doi:10.1007/b138233. 
Jobin, A., Ienca, M., & Vayena, E. (2019). The global landscape of AI ethics 
guidelines. Nat Mach Intell, 1, 389–399. doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0088-2. 
Jurić, M., Šandić, A., & Brcic, M. (2020).  AI safety: state of the field through 
quantitative lens. 43rd International Convention on Information and 
Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO). 
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2002/2002.05671.pdf. 
Kärkkäinen, K., & Joo, J. (2019). FairFace: Face Attribute Dataset for Balanced 
Race, Gender, and Age. University of California, Los Angeles. ArXiv. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.04913. 
Kenton, Z., Everitt, T., Weidinger, L., Gabriel, I., Mikulik, V., Irving, G. (2021). 
Alignment of Language Agents. DeepMind. https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.14659. 
Kilbertus, N., Rojas-Carulla, M., Parascandolo, G., Hardt, M., Janzing, D., &  
Schölkopf, B. (2017). Avoiding Discrimination Through Causal Reasoning. In 
the Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Neural Information 
Processing Systems, 656–666. doi:10.5555/3294771.3294834. 
 
Kleinberg, J., Mullainathan, S., & Raghavan, M. (2016). Inherent trade-offs in 
the fair determination of risk scores. Cornell University and Harvard University. 
ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807.  
Koh, P. W., Sagawa, S., Marklund, H., Xie, S. M., Zhang, M., Balsubramani, A., 
Hu, W., Yasunaga, M., Phillips, R. L., Beery, S., Leskovec, J., Kundaje, A., 
Pierson, E., Levine, S., Finn, C., & Liang, P. (2021). WILDS: A Benchmark of in-
the-Wild Distribution Shifts. In the 2021 International Conference on Machine 
Learning. https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.07421. 
Krafft, T. D., & Zweig, K. A. (2019). Transparency and traceability of algorithm-
based decision-making processes | A regulatory proposal. Verbraucherzentrale 
Bundesverband (Federal Association of Consumer Organizations). 
https://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/2019/05/02/19-01-
22_zweig_krafft_transparenz_adm-neu.pdf. 
Krafft. T. B., Hauer, M., Fetic, L., Kaminski, A., Puntschuh, M., Otto, P., Hubig. 
C., Fleischer, T., Grünke, P., Hillerbrand, R., Husted. C., & Hallensleben, S. 
(2020). From Principles to Practice - An interdisciplinary framework to 
operationalise AI ethics. AI Ethics Impact Group (VDE Association for Electrical, 
Electronic & Information Technologies/Bertelsmann Stiftung). https://www.ai-
ethics-impact.org/en. 
Krishnan, M. (2019). Against Interpretability: A Critical Examination of the 
Interpretability Problem in Machine Learning. Philosophy and Technology, 33(1). 
doi: 10.1007/s13347-019-00372-9. 
Leike, J., Martic, M., Krakovna, V., Ortega, P. A., Everitt, T., Lefrancq, A., 
Orseau, L., Legg, S. (2017). AI Safety Gridworlds. DeepMind. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.09883. 




Luengo-Oroz, M. (2019). Solidarity should be a core ethical principle of AI. Nat 
Mach Intell, 1(494). doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0115-3. 
Luong, B. T., Ruggieri, S., & Turini, F. (2011). k-NN As an Implementation of 
Situation Testing for Discrimination Discovery and Prevention. In Proceedings 
of the 17th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and 
Data Mining, 502–510. 
Maxmen, A. (2018). Self-driving car dilemmas reveal that moral choices are not 
universal. Nature, 562 (7728), 469–470. doi:10.1038/d41586-018-07135-0. 
Mehrabi, N., Morstatter, F., Saxena, N., Lerman, K., & Galstyan, A. (2019). A 
survey on bias and fairness in machine learning. ACM Computing Surveys, 
54(6), 1-35. doi:10.1145/3457607. 
Mikulik, V., Delétang, G., McGrath, T., Genewein, T., Martic, M., Legg, S., 
Ortega, P. A. (2020). Meta-trained agents implement Bayes-optimal agents. 
DeepMind. https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.11223. 
Mitchell, M., Wu, S., Zaldivar, A., Barnes, P. Vasserman, L., Hutchinson, B., 
Spitzer, E., Raji, I. D., & Gebru, T. (2019). Model Cards for Model Reporting. In 
the Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 
(January, 2019), 220–229. doi:10.1145/3287560.3287596. 
Mittelstadt, B., Russell, C., & Wachter, S. (2019). Explaining explanations in AI. 
In FAT* '19: Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and 
Transparency, 279–288. doi:10.1145/3287560.3287574. 
Mnhi, V., Kavukcuoglu, K., Silver, D., Graves, A., Antonoglou, I., Wierstra, D., 
& Riedmiller, M. (2013). Playing Atari with Deep Reinforcement Learning. 
DeepMind. https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5602. 
Morley, J., Floridi, L., Kinsey, L., & Elhalal, A. (2019). From what to how: An 
initial review of publicly available AI ethics tools, methods and research to 
translate principles into practices. Science and Engineering Ethics, 26(4), 2141–
2168. doi: 10.1007/s11948-019-00165-5. 
Morley, J., Elhalal, A., Garcia, F., Kinsey, l., Mökander, J., & Floridi, L. (2021). 
Ethics as a service: a pragmatic operationalisation of AI Ethics. Minds and 
Machines, 31,239–256. doi:10.1007/s11023-021-09563-w. 
Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. USA, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Nunes, P. (2019). EXCLUSIVO: levantamento revela que 90,5% dos presos por 
monitoramento facial no Brasil são negros. The Intercept Brasil. 
https://theintercept.com/2019/11/21/presos-monitoramento-facial-brasil-
negros/. 
Papernot, N., Faghri, F., Carlini, N., Goodfellow, I., Feinman, R., Kurakin, A., 
Xie, C., Sharma, Y., Brown, T., Roy, A., Matyasko, A., Behzadan, V., 
Hambardzumyan, K., Zhang, Z., Juang, Y., Li, Z., Sheatsley, R., Garg, A., 
Uesato, J., Gierke, W., Dong, Y., Berthelot, D., Hendricks, P., Rauber, J., Long, 
R., & McDaniel, P. (2016a). Technical Report on the CleverHans v2.1.0 
Adversarial Examples Library. ArXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.00768. 
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik, B. Z., & Swami, A. 
(2016b). Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning. In the 
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security, Abu Dhabi, UAE. https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02697. 
 
Pearl, J. (1995). Causation, Action, and Counterfactuals. In Computational 
Learning and Probabilistic Reasoning, A. Gammerman (ed.), USA, New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 235–255. 
Rahimi, A [Preserve Knowledge]. (2018, March 7). NIPS 2017 Test of Time Award 
“Machine learning has become alchemy.” | Ali Rahimi, Google [Video]. Youtube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7psGHgatGM. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. UK, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Rebuffi, S., Gowal, S., Calian, D. A., Stimberg, F., Wiles, O., & Mann, T. A. 
(2021). Fixing Data Augmentation to Improve Adversarial Robustness. In the 
2021 Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.01946. 
Rességuier, A., & Rodrigues, R. (2020). AI ethics should not remain toothless! A 
call to bring back the teeth of ethics. Big Data & Society, 1-5. 
doi:10.1177/2053951720942541. 
Russell, S., Dewey, D., & Tegmark, M. (2015). An Open Letter: Research 
Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence. Open Letter. Signed 
by 8,600 people. 
https://futureoflife.org/data/documents/research_priorities.pdf. 
Ruster, L. (2021). Dignity & Artificial Intelligence: Exploring the role of dignity 
in government AI ethics instruments. Centre for Public Impact. 
https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/partnering-for-learning/cultivating-a-
dignity-ecosystem-in-government-ai-ethics-instruments. 
Saravanakumar, K. K. (2021). The Impossibility Theorem of Machine Fairness -
- A Causal Perspective. Columbia University. ArXiv. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.06024. 
Sen, A. (1990). Justice: Means versus Freedoms. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
19. 
Silver, D., Huang, A., Maddison, C., et al. (2016). Mastering the game of Go with 
deep neural networks and tree search. Nature, 529, 484–489. 
doi:10.1038/nature16961.  
Silver, D., Singh, S., Precup, D., & Sutton, R. S. (2021). Reward is enough. 
Artificial Intelligence, 299(103535). doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103535. 
Soares, N. (2016). Value Learning Problem. In Ethics for Artificial Intelligence 
Workshop, 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-
2016), USA, New York 9–15. 
https://intelligence.org/files/ValueLearningProblem.pdf. 
Soares, N., Fallenstein, B., Yudkowsky, E., & Armstrong, S. (2015). Corrigibility. 
In Artificial Intelligence and Ethics, T. Walsh (ed.), AAAI Technical Report WS-
15-02. Palo Alto, CA: AAAI Press. 
Suresh, H., & Guttag, J. (2021). A Framework for Understanding Potential 
Sources of Harm throughout the Machine Learning Life Cycle. MIT Case Studies 
in Social and Ethical Responsibilities of Computing. 
doi:10.21428/2c646de5.c16a07bb. 
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., 
Fergus, R. (2013). Intriguing properties of neural networks. In the 2014 
International Conference on Learning Representations. Intriguing properties of 
neural networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199. 
Tramèr, F., Kurakin, A., Papernot, N., Boneh, D., & Mcdaniel, P. (2018). 
Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses. In the 2018 International 
Conference on Machine Learning. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07204. 
Verma, S., & Rubin, J. (2018). Fairness definitions explained. In the Proceedings 
of the 2018 IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Software Fairness (FairWare), 
1–7.  
Wang, Y., & Kosinski, M. (2017). Deep neural networks are more accurate than 
humans at detecting sexual orientation from facial images. 
doi:10.1037/pspa0000098. 
Wilkinson, M. D. et al. (2016). The FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data 
management and stewardship. Sci. Data, 3(160018). 
doi:10.1038/sdata.2016.18. 
Wolf, M., Miller, K., & Grodzinsky, F. (2017). Why we should have seen that 
coming: comments on microsoft’s tay experiment, and wider implications. ACM 
SIGCAS Computers and Society, 47(3), 54–64. 
Ye, W., Liu, S., Kurutach, T., Abbeel, P., & Gao, I. (2021). Mastering Atari Games 
with Limited Data. In the 35th Conference on Neural Information Processing 
Systems (NeurIPS 2021). https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.00210. 
Yuan, X., He, P., Zhu, Q., & Li, X. (2019). Adversarial Examples: Attacks and 
Defenses for Deep Learning.  IEEE Trans. Neural Netw. Learn. Syst., 30(9), 
2805–2824. doi:10.1109/TNNLS.2018.2886017. 
Zhu, Y., Ma, J., Sun, J., Chen, Z., Jiang, R., & Li, Z. (2021). Towards 
Understanding the Generative Capability of Adversarially Robust Classifiers. In 
the 2021 International Conference on Computer Vision. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.09093. 
